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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
NATIONAL SERVICES INDUSTRIES, (UNSI"), a defendant below, is the 
appellant against co-defendant B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 
("Norton"). 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING, ("Norton") a defendant below, was 
granted summary judgment, which is being appealed. Norton is the 
appellee. 
SHERMAN D. PACKER, was the plaintiff below, but settled after the 
summary judgment that is being appealed, and is not a party to the 
appeal. 
INTERNATIONAL MACHINE AND TOOL WORKS, INC. was named as a 
defendant below by plaintiff, but was never served. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this 
case under U.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)j and transferred it to the Utah Court 
of Appeals under its pour over authority granted in U.C.A. 78-2-
2(4). This Court has jurisdiction of the above captioned case 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
1. Did the lower court erroneously grant summary judgment based 
on its rulings that: 
A. Appellee Norton, as a ''component part" manufacturer, 
owed no duty to the plaintiff? 
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44, 
1. 1-6) 
B. No factual issues existed as to Norton's percentage of 
fault under U.C.A. 76-27-37 et seq. under plaintiff's theories 
of negligence, product liability and breach of warranty? 
Raised below: Summary Judgment order (p. 4, paragraph 6) 
^•White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P. 2d 1371 (Utah 1994) and Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1988) set out the standard for review of 
a grant of summary judgment. They state there must be no disputed 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. No deference is given to the lower court's legal 
conclusion but they are reviewed for correctness. 
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C. Norton, as a 'component part' manufacturer, could not 
foresee how its pail would be used? 
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 43, 
1. 18-25; p. 44, 1. 9) 
D. Norton's pail was not defective when it left the 
manufacturer? 
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44, 
1. 8-12) 
E. There were no material issues of fact in dispute? 
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 44, 
1. 13-17) 
2. Did the lower court error in its ruling that Appellee Norton's 
motion for summary judgment, unresisted by plaintiff, and under 
the circumstances in the present case, meets the Sullivan 
requirement of being "dismissed due to a lack of fault as a 
matter of law"2, and thus the jury could not determine Appellee 
Norton's proportionate fault?3 
2Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. Of Utah, 853 P. 2d 877, 884 (Utah 
1993) 
3The standard of review for legal conclusions is the Madsen case, 
supra. 
2 
Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 10, 
1. 18-20) 
3. Appellee Norton, in a motion for summary disposition, raised 
the issue of Appellant NSI's standing to resist its motion for 
summary judgment. The standing issues include:4 
A. Does a co-defendant have right, or a duty, to resist the 
motion for summary judgment by a co-defendant against the 
plaintiff? 
B. Does a co-defendant have standing to appeal the granting 
of a summary judgment motion between the plaintiff and a co-
defendant? 
C. Did appellee Norton properly raise these issues on 
appeal? 
4. Does a co-defendant have a duty to resist a motion for summary 
judgment between a co-defendant and the plaintiff, or pay that 
co-defendant's proportionate share of fault, and if so, should 
the lower court have granted NSI's request for additional time to 
respond to co-defendant Norton's motion?3 
4The standing issues were raised for the first time by Norton in 
a motion for summary disposition before the Utah Supreme Court. The 
motion was denied. See footnote 3, page 2. 
3 
Raised below: Summary Judgment motion transcript (R p. 10, 
1. 7-8) 
All issues were decided as a matter of law by the lower 
court, and this court reviews them for correctness, without 
deference to the lower courts decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1. This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff's eye was 
severely lacerated while opening the pour spout of a seven gallon 
metal pail of Hi-Foam Degreaser, a type of soap. 
2. The seal which struck plaintiff in the eye was 
manufactured by International Machine and Tool Works, Inc., who 
was named in the suit, but never served by plaintiff. 
Defendant/appellee Norton incorporated the International lid into 
Norton's top to its seven gallon metal pail. Norton sold the 
complete pail to appellant NSI, who filled the pail with soap, 
without any alteration of the lid or seal, placed the lid on the 
pail, and sold the pail and soap to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued 
based on product liability, negligence and breach of warranty. 
3. The accident occurred as follows. Plaintiff unscrewed 
the cap on the pour spout. Underneath was a metal seal with the 
instruction "Pry Out" (the "Pry Out" instruction was imprinted by 
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International, and sold by Norton with its container.) As 
plaintiff pried the seal, it suddenly exploded outward, hitting 
him in the eye. Despite several operations, plaintiff is 
functionally blind in the eye. 
4. The reason for the can being pressurized is relevant to 
this appeal, and those facts are cited below. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Appellee Norton moved for summary judgment against the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained an extension of time to respond (R 
p. 15, 1. 15-19) and told counsel for appellant NSI that he would 
respond (R pp. 15-16, 1. 25-2). 
2. Appellant NSI had not anticipated responding to Norton's 
motion for summary judgment. When plaintiff's counsel told 
counsel for NSI that plaintiff was not going to file a response, 
plaintiff's counsel said "whereupon, [counsel for NSI] had a 
small fit, and said he was going to file one. I said fine, go 
ahead. So, in fairness to [counsel for NSI] he did not know that 
[plaintiff] was not going to file a response,...until after 
[plaintiff's] response time was finished." (R pp. 15-16, 1. 24-
2). Counsel for appellant NSI responded within several working 
days. (R p. 9, 1. 22-24) . 
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3. At the summary judgment hearing appellee Norton argued 
that NSI's response was weeks late (since NSI did not request an 
extension, only the plaintiff did) (R p. 14, 1. 19-25). Appellee 
Norton argued co-defendant NSI's response should be ignored, 
leaving the court no alternative except to grant Norton's 
unresisted motion. (Norton's reply memorandum, p. 2; see also R 
p.24, 1. 7-14) . 
4. NSI argued that it had no obligation to resist a co-
defendant's motion, and in fact, did not resist it as long as 
Norton's fault would be determined by the jury. (R p. 10, 1. 1-
2; p. 12, 1. 1-5). 
5. NSI requested more time to build a case against Norton 
and respond to the summary judgment if the court held that NSI 
had an obligation to step into plaintiff's shoes and prove the 
plaintiff's case against Norton, or risk having the jury not 
determine Norton's fault. (R pp. 11-12, 1. 11-5; p. 23, 1. 6-
11) . 
6. Plaintiff's counsel maintained he was not obligated to 
file a response but that the Court "...has an obligation, under 
the rules, to decide the motion on the merits." (R p. 20, 1. 18-
24) . An "on the merits" ruling would prevent Norton from having 
its fault proportionately determined by the jury. 
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7. With this unusual procedural position before it, the 
Court gave an "advisory opinion" and stated the Court was 
"...inclined to disregard the opposition to Norton's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by National Service Industry. And the 
reason being that it was not timely filed.... Therefore, the 
status of the record is that there is a Motion for Summary 
Judgment by the defendant Norton. The plaintiff has not 
responded. And the Court is inclined to find that, based on the 
merits of the motion, that Norton is entitled to summary 
judgment." (R p. 24, 1. 7-14) 
8. NSI pointed out that the Court's advisory ruling would 
work a great injustice to ignore the merits of the motion yet 
grant the motion "on the merits." It would result in NSI paying 
for Norton's portion of fault. NSI also pointed out that co-
defendants seldom file responses to a co-defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, and that NSI had relied on plaintiff's 
counsel's representation that he would file a memorandum 
resisting the motion. (R pp. 24-25, 1. 17-5) 
9. Plaintiff's counsel agreed it would be unfair to ignore 
NSI's brief, since he had made the representation he would file 
an opposition to the motion, and plaintiff's counsel urged the 
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court to consider the motion on the merits. (R pp. 15-16, 1. 22-2) 
10. With this procedural scenario before him, the court 
reversed the advisory ruling and agreed to hear the motion on 
"...the merits, or lack thereof." (R p. 29, 1. 13-18) 
11. The lower court heard argument on the merits of 
Norton's motion for summary judgment and granted it. The lower 
court ruled that Norton's fault would not be determined by the 
jury. The Court ruled that Norton owed no duty to warn plaintiff 
and that the product was not defective as a matter of law. 
(Court's Summary Judgment, addendum 1) 
12. NSI and plaintiff negotiated a settlement and release 
which compensated plaintiff for all of his damages, and plaintiff 
agreed to assign claims and assist NSI in seeking to have 
Norton's fault determined. Plaintiff dismissed his claims 
against NSI. The lower court's summary judgment against 
plaintiff, thus became final and was appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The seal which injured plaintiff's eye, with the 
instruction "Pry Out" imprinted on it, was made by International. 
Norton purchased the seal and lid component from International 
and incorporated the seal into the top of Norton's pail. (Howard 
Norton depo. p. 50, 1. 16-22: page 19, lines 5-13) 
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2. NSI received the container top, including the seal, as 
one unit, preassembled by Norton. (Howard Norton Depo. p. 19, 1. 
8-13). 
3. Plaintiff followed Norton's imprinted instructions by 
prying the seal off with his pocket knife. Plaintiff describes 
his accident: 
I read the instructions [NSI's] to see how much product I 
was going to need, and to see how to use the product. And 
at that point, I attempted to remove the lid so that I could 
pour out the amount of product that I needed to use to clean 
the engine off with. I unscrewed the cap. After, you 
know, unscrewing the cap, it had the safety seal, which was 
a little metal ring and embossed in it was the words, uPry 
out," [International/Norton's instruction] with an arrow 
pointing down. At that point, I took my pocketknife out of 
my pocket, pried where it said to pry, heard an explosion, 
felt something instantaneously contact my eye, and felt 
pain. 
(Plaintiff's depo. pp. 35-36, 1. 16-1) 
4. There was also a printed label of instructions attached 
to the container by NSI. The NSI label gave instructions on how 
to use the product itself. 
5. Norton holds itself out as a "leading supplier of 
shipping containers for the Western United States"; that their 
"...pails are manufactured to meet the standards of the 
Department of Transportation" and that "Norton Manufacturing is a 
major supplier for many industries including paint, petroleum, 
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chemical, food, roofing, ag chem adhesives and ink." (Howard 
Norton depo. Exhibit 1) The pail is normally used to ship 
liquids. (Norton depo. p. 33, 1. 15-19) 
6. Mr. Norton knew of nothing that indicated the plaintiff 
did anything improper in removing the lid. (Howard Norton 
deposition page 51-52, lines 24-2) 
7. The seal's purpose is a "tamper proof seal." 
(Deposition of Norton employee Gerald Bettridge, p. 30, 1. 12) 
8. NSI filled the pail with soap, without any alteration of 
the seal, and crimped the top onto the pail. NSI then sold the 
pail and its ingredients to plaintiff. (R p. 3, 1. 18-19) 
9. Dr. Noel de Nevers, a professor of chemical engineering 
at the University of Utah Engineering Department, testified that 
the accident "...was caused by the inner seal piece being driven 
by gas pressure into the eye of the plaintiff" (de Nevers depo., 
p. 8, lines 14-20) . 
10. Dr. de Nevers thought that the pressure may have been 
created by chemical reactions in the NSI product, or perhaps by 
formation of Peroxides. Dr. de Nevers ran gas chromatograph and 
mass spectoptometry tests, and consulted with other experts. He 
concluded: 
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Q. And the other possibility is some chemical reaction, but 
you've fairly well ruled that out. 
A. I can find no evidence to support it. That doesn't 
guarantee that it did not occur. 
Q. But in your opinion, it did not occur? 
A. I believe it did not occur, 
(de Nevers Depo. p. 57, 1.13-18; see, also, p. 28, 1. 4-13; 
pp. 52-53, 1. 9-9; p. 54, 1. 17-25; p. 57, 1. 13-18) 
11. Dr. Fineman, NSI's chemist, testified that the 
ingredients in NSI's soap cannot cause a pressure buildup. u 
...as a chemist, I have to respond by telling you that there's no 
basis whatever for any pressure buildup in this product." 
(Fineman depo. pp. 32-33, 1. 23-4; p. 36, 1. 7-22) 
12. Dr. de Nevers eliminated any chemical reaction of the 
contents of the container as the cause of the accident. Rather 
than the contents causing pressure, plaintiff's expert testified 
that plaintiff's accident occurred because of pressurization due 
to: 
(a) Change in altitude. The product was packaged at sea 
level. When opened in Utah's higher altitude, the atmospheric 
pressure was less, making the container "pressurized" in relation 
to the outside air, independent of the container's contents; and 
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(b) the product was packaged at a slightly lower temperature 
than the temperature when opened. Higher temperatures can create 
higher pressure inside the can. Dr. de Nevers was uncertain about 
the affect of temperature on the NSI can. 
Other similar facts are quoted or cited to in the arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. NORTON HAD A DUTY. 
The lower court erred when it held Norton owed no duty to 
provide a safe product or warn of its product's danger. Anyone 
who sells a defective product is subject to liability for 
injuries caused by that defective product. The law clearly 
imposes upon manufacturers of goods, and even component parts, a 
duty to provide non-defective goods and/or a duty to warn of the 
products danger. Norton had a duty to provide a safe container 
that would release altitude change pressure in a safe manner. 
B. NORTON'S PRODUCT WAS A CONTAINER. 
The court was mistaken in holding that Norton was only a 
component part manufacturer rather than a manufacturer of 
containers. It was not only foreseeable by Norton but intended 
by Norton that their product be used as a container to hold 
liquids. This differentiates them from a component part 
manufacturer who cannot reasonably foresee how its component or 
12 
raw material will be used. Norton therefore had a duty to 
provide a safe product and/or to warn of the dangers of this 
product when used in its foreseeable and intended use. Regardless 
of this argument, under either theory, Norton had a duty to 
provide a non-defective good and the lower court improperly ruled 
that it had no duty. 
C. NORTON FAILED TO WARN OF THE CONTAINERS DANGER. 
Norton put instructions on the container as to how to open 
it. Norton knew of the danger of pressure build up from an 
altitude change yet failed to include in its instructions on 
opening the container any warning of the potential pressure build 
up or how to safely open the lid. Norton was negligent by 
failing to warn of the danger or how one could safely open the 
container. 
D. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THERE WAS NO MATERIAL 
ISSUE OF FACT BEFORE THE COURT. 
The court failed to look at factual issues before the court 
in a light most favorable to NSI. The plaintiff raised the 
question of why the container was pressurized and was this 
unreasonably dangerous. The evidence before the court indicated 
the pressure was created by an altitude change and would have 
occurred regardless of what NSI put in the container. This 
13 
question of fact could lead a jury to determine the container 
rather than NSI's soap was dangerous and the cause of plaintiff's 
injury. 
E. STANDING. 
Norton argued NSI had no standing to oppose the motion for 
summary judgment or to appeal the ruling. Law requires an 
opportunity for NSI to litigate the issue of Norton's fault. The 
Defendant/Appellee was not dismissed on an adjudication on the 
merits and therefore should be included in an apportionment of 
fault. The lower court's erroneous ruling on the lack of 
Norton's duty, the non-defective nature of the "component", and 
that there were no material issues of fact before the court 
allowed Norton to be dismissed without a fair adjudication of the 
merits. Coupled with no opposition from plaintiff's counsel, it 
allowed a defendant to be improperly dismissed on the merits. 
This would then expose NSI to a disproportionate share of the 
fault and costs of injury since, under case law, a defendant 
dismissed on the merits is not included in apportionment. The 
open courts provision, due process and fairness dictate a 
dismissal is not on the merits and NSI should be allowed to prove 
Norton's fault. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: REVIEW OF LOWER COURTS GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, (Utah 1994), the 
Utah Supreme Court set out a clear standard for reviewing a lower 
court's summary judgment. The court states: 
The standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is 
well established. Summary judgment is proper when there are 
no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Citations 
omitted). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter 
of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness. 
(Citations omitted). 
We also note that summary judgment is generally 
inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and should be employed 
"only in the most clear-cut case." (Citations omitted). 
11
 Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." (Citations 
omitted). "Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless 
the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law,' and reasonable 
minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances." (Citations omitted)(Emphasis 
added) 
The standard is clear. This court reviews the case anew, 
without deference to the lower court, to assure this drastic 
remedy is not misapplied. 
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POINT II: THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT NORTON OWED NO DUTY TO 
PLAINTIFF WAS ERRONEOUS. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Court's Review is without deference to the lower Court. 
Whether or not a duty is owed is a matter of law for the court to 
decide. This court reviews matters of law without deference to 
lower court decisions. BeruJbe v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P. 2d 
1033, 1039 (Utah 1989). 
B. Norton Owed a Duty To Plaintiff and NSI. 
The lower court order held "...Norton did not have a duty to 
warn" (Summary judgment, p.4, para. l)of the dangers of the 
container it manufactured. Case law simply does not support this 
conclusion of law. 
Norton did not argue a lack of duty in its brief in the 
lower court, but at the oral argument Norton focused on the claim 
that it had no legal duty to either plaintiff or NSI, since 
Norton claimed to be a * component part" manufacturer5. Norton 
s
 ^...getting to the bottom line on a motion for summary 
judgment, Your Honor, as a matter of law, has the decision to 
determine whether my client had a duty. That is a legal question. 
(R. P. 8, lines 10-13). "As a matter of law, we have cited to Your 
Honor cases that under this scenario we don't have a duty, as a 
component part manufacturer, to the plaintiff in this case. We don't 
have a duty to [NSI] since there is no contribution in this state, 
your Honor'' (R. P.8-9, 1.22-1) 
16 
evidently relies on several cases cited in its brief in support 
of its claim, and the Court's ruling, that Norton owed no duty to 
plaintiff or NSI. 
The first case is Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 
1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992). In Sperry, Bauermeister designed, 
manufactured, and assembled a milling system. Micron, who was 
granted summary judgment, had supplied Bauermeister with an air 
lock which was incorporated by Bauermeister into its mill. 
Plaintiff's expert testified that "...the defect existed in the 
design of the milling system, not with any one component part." 
Sperry Id., at 1515. It was plaintiff's expert's opinion that 
the responsibility for the defect "...would be the responsibility 
of the designer herein ... an interlock cannot be effectively 
designed into a component part without first knowing how that 
component part is going to be integrated into a system." Sperry 
Id. at 1516. 
Based on this factual evidence, the Federal District Court 
found that "...the Micron airlock was not defective." Sperry 
Id., at 1516 (emphasis added). The court never found that Micron 
did not owe a duty, only that Micron's component part was not 
defective. The former is a matter of law, the latter a question 
17 
of fact. Sperry not only fails to support Norton's claim of no 
duty, but held there was a duty. 
A second case cited by Norton is Miller v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours, 811 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). Miller involved 
DuPont's PTFE fibers which were sold to Vitech. Vitech mixed the 
DuPont fibers with other ingredients and, "...using its own 
patented procedures, manufactured and marketed the substance 
known as Proplast." Miller Id., at 1287. The Federal District 
Judge again concluded "... there is no proof the PTFE was a 
defective "component part" of the allegedly defective proplast 
manufactured by Vitech. Again, the Court did not rule there was 
"no duty", but that the PTFE was not defective. 
In Miller, the Federal District Judge also accepted a report 
by the Magistrate, which was published as an appendix to the 
Court's decision. In the appendix the Magistrate used some 
language referring to FDA approval of medications and medical 
implants, stating there was no duty on behalf of the component 
part manufacturers to assure that the specialized medical use was 
safe. This language regarding "no duty," appearing in the 
appendix, refers to medical implant and prescription drugs, under 
the auspices of the FDA, which is clearly inapplicable here. 
Another portion of the Magistrate's appendix is a correct 
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statement of the law xx... although the A[t]he manufacturer of a 
component part certainly may be held liable for a defect in its 
product. even after that part is assembled into a larger 
product [,] (citations omitted)..., the defect must be present in 
the single 'self contained component part7 itself (citations 
omitted).'" (Citations omitted.) Norton is liable for the defect 
in its product. The seal which it sold to NSI was defective in 
that it could not release pressure (even due solely to a change 
in altitude(see below)) in a slow manner, but rather exploded. 
Norton's container was defective in that its opening instructions 
"PRY OUT" were insufficient and failed to warn the consumer of 
the danger of releasing normal pressure, irrespective of the 
product inside the container, in a nonexplosive manner. 
Manufacturers, including Norton, owe a duty to the plaintiff 
of supplying non-defective parts. The Court's ruling that Norton 
owed no duty is simply erroneous. Utah has adopted Section 402A 
of the Restatement of Torts, see Earnest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). Section 402A states 
Ml) one who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused...." 
Emphasis added. Norton falls under section 4 02A as much as 
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other manufacturers. The Court's ruling that Norton owed no duty 
is erroneous and must be overturned. Whether there is a factual 
question regarding Norton's breach of the duty is treated below. 
POINT III: THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT NORTON'S PAIL WAS A 
"COMPONENT PART" WAS ERRONEOUS. 
A. The Court's Ruling. 
The Court's summary judgment stated that "Norton shipped to 
NSI the component parts consisting of the cover and the steel 
pail." Summary judgment, page 2, emphasis added. The lower 
court stated u... as a component part manufacturer supplying the 
steel pail and cover...Norton did not have a duty to warn." 
B. Law of "Component Part". 
The cases cited by Norton in the lower court, hold that a 
component part manufacturer, whose product is not unreasonably 
dangerous by itself or defective, is not liable if a subsequent 
manufacturer designs and manufactures an unreasonably dangerous 
product, using the original manufacturer's raw material or 
component part. Norton cited Sperry, supra (an airlock 
incorporated into a milling system which was designed, 
manufactured and assembled by another defendant) and Miller, 
supra (DuPont fiber that was mixed with other ingredients, in a 
patented process, to make biomedical implant joints). 
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Contrary to the lower court's ruling, Norton's pail and lid 
were not "component parts," but were completed "containers." The 
basic difference is who designed and manufactured the product and 
whether its use by others was foreseeable. Norton designed and 
manufactured the container. (R p. 3, 1. 1-14). NSI did not 
contribute to the manufacturing, but only u...fill[ed] the pail 
with a variety of products, and then clamp[ed] the lid down." (R 
p. 3, 1. 18-19). The lower court ruled the container was 
"...manufactured pursuant to the specifications of NSI...", but 
that is misleading. NSI specifies a certain size of container, 
type of lid, color etc, just as one might specify options on a 
car. But is Norton who makes the pail itself. As counsel for 
Norton stated at the hearing, 
Norton has received directions from [NSI]. They 
will call in. They will make a bulk order. They 
gave my client directions in its litho process, 
the color that they wanted the pail painted and 
the name that they wanted to put on the pail. 
[Norton] then makes the pail. They make the 
cover, which is what we call the lid, the yellow 
part, and they install into the cover a screw cap 
and lid type material from International Machine 
and Tool..." 
(R p. 3, 1. 2-10)(emphasis added). 
Norton's pail is not a component part, but a container. The 
addition of a liquid to the pail, which was clearly anticipated 
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by Norton, cannot make the pail raw material or component part. 
It was not only foreseeable to Norton that the container would be 
used to hold a liquid, such as NSI's soap, but Norton 
specifically intended that use. (Norton depo. Exhibit 1). 
C. Norton's Product is a ^Container." 
Courts have treated containers differently than components. 
Even in Utah case law, containers have been treated not as a 
component part of a product, but as a separate item. In Palmer 
v. Wasatch Chemical Company, 353 P.2d 985 (Utah 1960) the court 
looked at a case involving tort liability for a defective 
container. The court treated the contents, sulfuric acid, and 
the two containers separately. Other courts have done the same. 
There are many cases holding container manufacturers liable, and 
Norton's case is analogous to those cases, not the component part 
cases. 
One example of a container case is Van Duzer v. Shoshone 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 714 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1987). Van Duzer 
involved a Canada Dry bottle which exploded, severely injuring 
plaintiff's eye. Plaintiff sued both the container manufacturer 
and the bottler. The jury found for both defendants. The 
Supreme Court of Nevada reversed, as a matter of law. 
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We are at a loss to understand how the jury could 
have concluded form this evidence that the bottle 
did not fail to perform in the manner to be 
reasonably expected. The bottle was handled in 
precisely the manner in which it was intended to 
be handled... A product container that cannot 
withstand the rigors of normal shopping practices 
is unreasonably dangerous and, by definition, 
defective. 
Van Duzer, Id., at 813. (emphasis added) The same reasoning is 
applicable to the present case. It could be said, as a matter of 
law, that the plaintiff was opening Norton's container exactly as 
Norton expected it to be opened. Plaintiff pried out the seal 
Norton instructed him to "Pry Out". Norton knew that pressure 
normally builds up in its container, due merely to altitude and 
temperature changes6. Norton found nothing improper with the 
manner in which plaintiff removed the seal.7 To paraphrase Van 
Duzer, UA product container that cannot withstand the rigors of 
6Q: Mr. Norton, I presume you're aware that if something, even 
such as a bag of potato chips, is packaged in California and brought, 
for example to Utah, which is much higher in altitude, that some 
pressure builds up in the packaging? 
A: Yes. 
Q; And that not only altitude will affect that pressure, but 
temperature as well? 
A: Yes. (Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24). 
7Q: Mr. Norton, anything you know of, that you read or heard, 
that indicates my client did anything improper in attempting to 
remove the lid? 
A: No. (Norton depo. p. 52-3, 1. 24-2) . 
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normal [opening] practices is unreasonably dangerous and, by 
definition, defective." Van Duzer, Id., at 813. 
In Van Duzer, either the contents of the container or the 
container itself was defective and caused the injury, as a matter 
of law. The contents by having too much pressure or the 
container because it was manufactured improperly and could not 
withstand the pressure that was properly in the bottle. The 
court therefore remanded the case for a new trial. With a 
component, it may not be reasonably foreseeable how it may be 
used. With a container, it is not only reasonably foreseeable 
how it will be used, but the intent of the manufacturer that it 
will be used as a container. A container manufacturer has a duty 
to make their product safe or to warn of the dangers. 
Van Duzer, on very similar facts, found as matter of law 
that the container was defective. Certainly a factual issue 
exists in the present case. Norton's citation of component part 
cases is misleading. This is a container case, and it was not 
only foreseeable, but Norton intended that its container carry 
liquid, knew it would have pressure in it, and knew it would be 
opened the way it was. 
The lower court's ruling that Norton was a component part 
manufacturer is erroneous, and mislead the court on whether the 
24 
use of its product was foreseeable. Unlike DuPont's non-
defective fibers being mixed in a patented formula to make 
temporomandibular joints, Norton knew of the use NSI and 
plaintiff would put its container. Norton designed, manufactured 
and instructed on how to open its container. The design was 
defective in not allowing the slow release of pressure that 
Norton knew would be present. Norton failed to warn, in its 
instructions to open its container, of the danger of the pressure 
it knew would be there. 
D. Failure to Warn. 
A manufacturer of a product has a duty to warn if there is a 
danger with its product when it knew or should have known of the 
hazard or danger. 
When a manufacturer or seller knows or should know 
of unreasonable dangers associated with the use of 
its product and the dangers are not obvious to 
product users, a manufacturer has an obligation to 
warn of the dangers and a breach of that 
obligation constitutes negligence. 
Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. V. Matz, 842 P.2d 198 (Colo. 1992). See 
also Halter v. Waco Scaffolding & Equipment, 797 P.2d 790 
(Colo.App. 1990). 
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Norton was responsible for the design of the container and 
it decided, despite its knowledge of pressure,8 that no pressure 
release device, or warning, would be a part of its product. As a 
manufacturer of cans, Norton, knew that its cans would be 
distributed throughout the Western United States and subject to 
varying atmospheric pressures at different altitudes. (See 
citations in footnote 6, and also Norton depo. Exhibit 1). The 
cost of putting a proper warning on the can or lid would be 
minimal. 
A duty to warn also applies to strict liability cases. 
Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc. Supra, cited by Norton, states "The 
theory of strict liability is further broken down into liability 
for defective design and liability for failure to warn of an 
inherent danger in the product." The instructions for use of the 
contents of the can were supplied by NSI as the court noted. But 
the instructions for the opening of the container were supplied 
by Norton. Norton sells the can with the seal , which injured 
plaintiff, and which had the opening instructions "Pry Out" 
imprinted the seal, already incorporated into its container. 
(Norton Depo. P. 19, L. 1-13). Norton had a duty to warn 
See Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24, quoted in footnote above. 
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regarding the opening of its container, and it failed to 
properly warn. 
As detailed more in the subsequent section, the pail became 
pressurized because of altitude. Norton knew this pressurization 
occurred.9 The soap inside did not create the pressure. The 
same accident would have happened had the pail contained any of 
the other liquids for which it was designed (ink, vegetable oil, 
etc., if it had contained water, or even if it was empty). It 
was the seal on the pail itself which created the injury, not the 
contents. It was the "Pry Out" instructions, already imprinted 
when Norton sold the pail, that plaintiff was following when his 
eye was injured. 
The law is also clear that the original manufacturer of a 
product is liable, even though the final assembly of the product 
is delegated to another company. This is true even if the final 
assembly is done incorrectly (which is not an allegation in the 
present case). Caporale v. Raleigh Industries of America, Inc., 
382 So.2d 849 (Fla.App. 1980). 
9See Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24. 
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E • Summary. 
Norton designs, manufactures and sells containers, as 
complete products except for placing a lid on top and sealing it. 
Norton designed the containers to hold liquids. The container in 
the current case was, in and of itself, dangerous, in that it did 
not have a safe way to release the pressure that Norton knew 
would build up due to mere altitude changes and temperature 
change. Norton owed a duty to plaintiff and to NSI to 
manufacture a safe container or warn of the danger. The court's 
rulings that Norton owed no duty, and that the pail was a 
"component part" are erroneous and the case must be remanded to 
have Norton's proportionate fault determined. 
POINT IV: THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT THERE WAS NO MATERIAL 
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO NORTON" S FAULT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The complaint (Exhibit 1 to Norton's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion For Summary Judgment, P 4-6) includes allegations of 
both strict liability and negligence. They are treated jointly 
in this section because similar facts support both legal 
theories. The Utah Supreme Court has previously stated that 
"Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
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standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." White, 
Supra (emphasis added). 
B. Factual issues are created by Plaintiff's testimony. 
Plaintiff testified that he followed the instructions of 
"Pry Out" on the seal of Norton!s pail. While prying, he heard 
an explosion, like a firecracker, and was struck in the eye by 
the seal ( Packer Depo. p. 35-36, 1. 13-1, quoted supra). 
Plaintiff's testimony alone is sufficient to raise a question of 
fact as to the defect of Norton's container and Norton's 
negligence. The container was pressurized, and the resulting 
injury shows it was obviously dangerous. Norton acknowledges 
that altitude and temperature differences will pressurize its 
containers. (Norton depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24 quoted supra). No 
expert testimony is even needed. Jurors can decide whether 
containers that the manufacturer acknowledges will become 
pressurized in their normal use are unreasonably dangerous in the 
expectations of the consumer. No expert testimony is necessary 
to submit to the jury whether blinding the plaintiff is within 
the reasonable expectation of a consumer. There are sufficient 
facts to submit to the jury whether the Norton container was 
defective or negligently designed in not have a mechanism to 
release pressure that Norton knows can be present in normal 
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handling. The same is true for whether Norton should have 
warned, in addition to its "Pry Out" instruction, about the 
danger of the pressure due to altitude and temperature 
variations. In the Van Duzen, supra, the court reversed a jury 
finding, as a matter of law, when a container, in normal use, 
partially blinded a plaintiff. Certainly a factual issue is 
raised here. 
C. Expert Testimony Creates Factual Issues• 
In addition to plaintiff's testimony, plaintiff hired Dr. 
Noel de Nevers, Professor in the Department of Chemical 
Engineering at the University of Utah. Dr. de Nevers did 
extensive testing in order to determine what created the 
pressure in the can plaintiff opened. Dr. de Nevers testing took 
place on a second container, also manufactured by Norton, which 
was filled with soap by NSI out of the same batch, on the same 
day, as the container which injured plaintiff. This container 
was given to plaintiff by a friend, who purchased it at the same 
time. 
This similar container was found to be pressurized at 5.5 
PSI by Dr. de Nevers. Based on his testing, Dr. de Nevers 
testified that plaintiff's eye injury "was caused by the inner 
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seal piece being driven by gas pressure into the eye of the 
plaintiff". (De Nevers depo. p. 8, lines 14-20) 
Dr. de Nevers addressed three possible sources of the gas: 
1) a chemical reaction involving the soap itself; 2) an increase 
in altitude; and 3) an increase in temperature. 
1. The soap did not create the pressure in the container. 
Dr. de Nevers extracted the pressurized gas from inside the 
similar container into a sterile vacuum. The gas that 
pressurized the pail was tested by Dr. de Nevers to determine its 
source. The tests included gas chromatograph and mass 
spectrometry analyzation of the containers gas. Dr. de Nevers 
anticipated the gas had been formed by a chemical reaction of 
some sort involving the contents of the container. Instead, the 
compressed gas was indistinguishable from air.1 The possibility 
of the contents of the container creating a chemical reaction was 
thoroughly tested by Dr. de Nevers and excluded2. Dr. Fineman 
1
 (Dr. de Nevers depo., pp.20-21, lines 15-16; pp 22-23, 
lines 24-3; p 63, lines 11-19) The nitrogen-oxygen ratio was 
virtually the same as air, and there were no other components in the 
sample that were not found in the same approximate quantities as air. 
(De Nevers depo., p 21, line 3-12; p 63, lines 11-19). 
2Dr. de Nevers tested for peroxides, which can decompose 
violently, ''...eventually concluding that there was no evidence to 
support that conclusion", (Depo. p. 28 1. 6-13) and "...they were not 
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of NSI, testified the same, "... as a chemist, I have to respond 
by telling you that there's no basis whatever for any pressure 
build up in this product." (Fineman depo, P. 33, L. 2-4.) 
2. The altitude change "certainly" pressurized Norton's 
Container. 
Dr. de Nevers calculated the pressure and speed of the seal 
that would occur simply by transporting the container from sea 
level to Salt Lake City. "Well, one thing we know for certain is 
that when such a container is brought from sea level to Salt Lake 
City, the external atmospheric pressure changes from 14.7 to 12.5 
psi." (de Nevers depo. p. 38, lines 18-22.) That pressure 
differential amounts to "2.2 pounds per square inch." De Nevers 
depo. p. 39, lines 3-5. Dr. de Nevers calculated, based on two 
different sets of assumptions, the velocity the exploding seal 
based on the 2.2 psi. The maximum velocity, using non-
conservative assumptions, "leads to a velocity of 234 feet per 
second" de Nevers depo. p. 39, lines 6-17. That results in a 
speed of almost 160 miles per hour. Using conservative 
a cause of this accident". (Depo P. 52, L. 15-22). Dr. de Nevers 
considered a chemical reaction of the NSI product and "...concluded 
that that was extremely unlikely", (Depo P. 54, L.17-25), could 
"...find no evidence to support it", and "...believe[s] it did not 
occur." (Depo. P. 57, L.13-18). 
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assumptions, the seal would be blown off at about 4 0 feet per 
second (De Nevers depo. p. 41, lines 14-2) or 27 miles per hour. 
Norton ships its containers all over the Western United States. 
Norton was aware that altitude pressurized its cans (See Norton 
depo. p. 17, 1. 16-24). Certainly, a factual question exists as 
to whether Norton's container was defective in not releasing 
pressure slowly upon opening and for failure to warn of this 
recognized problem. Whether altitude propels the seal at 27 
miles per hour or 160 miles per hour or, likely somewhere in 
between, it is unreasonable and dangerous. 
3. Pressure unlikely by change in temperature. 
The third cause which Dr. de Nevers hypothecated was an 
increase of pressure caused by higher temperature. Dr. de Nevers 
found an approximate 11 degree difference in temperature between 
when the pail was sealed and when it was opened.1 But Dr. de 
Nevers was not sure if such a small temperature rise would create 
pressure.2 
1(De Nevers depo. p. 42-43, lines 23-19) Based on the average 
temperature of 66 degrees in California when it was filled and 75 
degrees in Salt Lake City when it was opened. 
2
"The effort I made to try and find the relationship between 
solubility and temperature was an effort. To answer your last 
question, I was unable to get an answer that I consider satisfactory. 
If we go to trial, I will obviously have to work more on that" de 
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The only clear evidence regarding temperature related 
pressure is from Dr. Fineman. He testified that it does not 
create any. "...as a chemist, I have to respond by telling you 
that there is no basis what ever for any pressure build up in 
this product." (Fineman depo. p. 33, 1. 2-4; see, also, p. 36, 
1. 7-22 and p. 53, 1.16-23) The state of the evidence is, 
temperature had little, if any affect on the container's 
pressure. 
4• Summary. 
The only evidence of how the pressure was created to expel 
the lid into plaintiff's eye, is the difference in altitude. In 
fact, that is a basic principle of science which is undisputed 
and which Norton acknowledges. The contents of the container did 
not react to or cause any increase in pressure in the pail. The 
container would have been pressurized if NSI had put any other 
liquid in it, or if Norton had sold the can to one of many other 
companies who may have placed ink, water, vegetable oil or a host 
of other liquids for which the can was designed. There is at 
least a factual question of the container being defective or 
negligently designed, and of Norton failing to warn. 
Nevers depo. p. 53-54, lines 22-1. 
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The expert testimony shows Norton's container as the 
defective product, and at minimum creates a factual issue. It 
was normal use of the container, not the contents, which 
pressurized the container. Norton knew this occurred but took no 
steps to release the pressure slowly or warn of the danger. 
Certainly, this is a disputed material fact. 
D. Marshaling the Evidence. 
The only two experts in the case, indicate that the contents 
of the container could not build up pressure. Norton itself 
acknowledges that altitude differences and temperature increases 
will create pressure in its cans. One might wonder how summary 
judgment was possibly granted. Norton did advance arguments and 
facts and those will be treated here. 
It should be noted, that there is no requirement that NSI 
"marshal the evidence", as is necessary when a jury verdict is 
appealed. Since the lower court granted summary judgment, NSI 
need only show that, somewhere in the case, there is enough 
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. NSI marshals the 
evidence, because it believes that it has not only a genuine 
issue of fact, but a compelling case. 
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1. No Duty. 
First, Norton's main argument at the hearing, was that as a 
"component part" manufacturer, it owed no duty. This argument 
was treated above. Of course, if you owe no duty, the facts 
showing that your product injured someone are irrelevant. As 
outlined above, the Court's ruling that Norton owed no duty was 
erroneous. The record, however, is replete with allegations and 
conclusions that Norton owed no duty in the present case. (See, 
e.g. R p. 44, 1. 4-6; R p. 38, 1. 19-23; R p. 8, 1. 10-13; R pp. 
8-9, 1. 22-6; R p. 14, 1. 5-7) 
2. Misleading facts. 
Second, Norton uses facts, which although basically true, 
are misleading. The Court ruled that "Norton was never advised 
by NSI that the steel pail and components shipped to NSI would 
contain products creating vapor pressure in the head space...." 
(Summary Judgment p. 3.) {See also R p. 41, 1. 19; p. 39, 1. 17; 
p. 40, 1. 7-13; p. 5, 1. 12-13; R p . 6, 1. 9-12). These 
statements are basically accurate - NSI did not inform Norton 
that the product would create "vapor pressure," nor that NSI 
needed a "pressure container" because, in fact, "...there is no 
basis whatsoever for any pressure buildup in this product." (Dr. 
Fineman depo. p. 33, 1. 3-4) Norton's quotes from depositions 
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that NSI did not inform Norton that the NSI product would create 
vapor pressure is misleading, and not the basis of summary 
j udgment. 
3. The Unusual Procedural Status of the Case, 
Norton made much ado that Dr. de Nevers had never uttered 
the word "defective" in his deposition. He opined, as outlined 
above, that the Norton seal damaged plaintiff's eye, and was 
propelled there by pressure. Dr. de Nevers was certain that some 
of the pressure came from a mere increase of altitude. Norton 
admitted that it was aware that altitude and temperature would 
pressurize its containers. Yet Norton never warned of these 
dangers, Norton never provided a way to release the pressure 
slowly upon opening its containers. That is certainly enough to 
raise a question of fact as to whether the container is 
defective. But no one asked Dr. de Nevers if the container was 
"defective." NSI, not having access to plaintiff's expert, was 
unable to file an affidavit, as is usually done, succinctly 
summarizing the necessary testimony to combat a motion for 
summary judgment. While it is easy to focus on the absence of 
the word "defective," it is the whole testimony that is 
important, not presence or absence of one touchstone. 
Norton pointed out that Dr. Fineman of NSI testified that 
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NSI continued to use the same type of pail, and that he did not 
see anything wrong with the steel pail. (Fineman depo. p. 82, 1. 
1-7). Norton argued that since Dr. Fineman did not state the 
Norton container was defective, that there was no issue of fact 
as to it being defective. Again, plaintiff's failure to respond 
to the motion for summary judgment created some conclusory 
arguments for Norton to use, but they are without substance. 
Naturally, Fineman did not render the opinion that the 
container, which his company sold, was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous. NSI's primary contention against plaintiff was that 
plaintiff stabbed himself in the eye with his knife while 
attempting to open the container. But plaintiff espoused a 
different theory that the jury may very well believe. Dr. 
Fineman's primary opinion does not hide the genuine issues of 
fact. He also testified that "... as a chemist... there is no 
basis what ever for any pressure buildup in [NSI's} product." 
(Fineman depo. P. 33, 1. 2-4). Since Norton's container builds 
up pressure, no matter what the product inside, Norton must warn 
and design an opening that releases the pressure slowly. A 
factual issue clearly exists. 
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4. ™ Component Part" Law Does Not Hide the Issues of Fact. 
Last, Norton exposed the "component part" theory. The Court 
ruled, at Norton's request, that 
NSI would package their own product in the pail, 
close the container, apply a warning label 
authored by NSI to the container and would ship 
the product to an NSI customer without consulting 
with Norton at any step in the process. 
Summary Judgment, p. 3, paragraph 1, see also paragraphs 2-3. 
While it is true that NSI packaged its product in Norton's 
container, closed the container, and put a label identifying the 
contents, and describing its use (including warnings about 
potential dangers of using the contents) none of those facts 
warrant summary judgment for Norton. Norton not only 
anticipated, but intended that its container be so used. The law 
of component parts and containers is outlined above. Even if it 
were a component part case, NSI's filling Norton's container and 
selling it is, at most, a factual issue for the jury to decide 
whether NSI should have done more to warn or explain the opening 
of the container. However, this case is clearly a container 
case, and Norton must design and warn for its anticipated use as 
a container, including Norton's admitted knowledge of pressure 
build up due to altitude and pressure changes. 
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Last, the procedural posture of the case, where the 
plaintiff did not resist the motion, certainly affected the 
outcome. Although plaintiff's counsel indicated that he did not 
respond because he thought Norton's motion had merit (R p. 20, 1. 
8-10; p. 21, 1. 12-13) he also frankly acknowledged that the 
procedural posture did not hurt him. "Frankly, it doesn't matter 
to me. It literally doesn't matter to me. That's why I didn't 
file a response.... It literally doesn't make any difference to 
me if it is both of these defendants at trial or one." (R p. 21, 
1. 10-15) UI could have made an opposition, and maybe the 
outcome will be different. I don't know what the outcome is 
going to be." (R p. 20, 1. 4-6). 
Summary judgment is a harsh procedure, used only in the most 
clear cut cases. The lower court incorrectly ruled Norton had no 
duty to warn. Factual issues abound as to Norton's liability. 
This simply is not a clear cut case where Norton is entitled to 
summary judgment. The Court erred and the summary judgment 
ruling should be reversed. 
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A, Did the lower court err in ruling that Norton's fault could 
not be determined by the jury? 
NSI did not object to Norton's summary judgment, as long as 
Norton's fault was determined by the jury. Sullivan holds that a 
defendant who is dismissed "pursuant to an adjudication on the 
merits, may not be included in the apportionment" of fault. 
Sullivan at 884. The issue here is whether a dismissal that has 
been obtained through lack of good faith opposition by the 
plaintiff is "an adjudication on the merits" as that phrase is 
used in Sullivan. It would be a denial of due process (United 
States Constitution, 5th Amendment; Utah Constitution, Article 1 
§7) and open courts (Utah Constitution, Article 1 §11) to so 
hold. Norton, if at fault, must have its fault determined at 
some point in the litigation process or NSI must pay for Norton's 
share of fault. This is the opposite result intended by 
Sullivan. 
Sullivan's basic reasoning is sound. When there is a "lack 
of fault" as a matter of law, the dismissed party's exclusion 
from apportionment fault does not "subject the remaining 
defendants to liability in excess of their proportionate fault". 
Id. at 884. However, there is a distinction between "lack of 
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fault as a matter of law" and ''adjudication on the merits." For 
example, a dismissal of a party, for the plaintiff's failure to 
prosecute, may act as an "adjudication upon the merits" as to the 
plaintiff . See U.R.C.P. Rule 41(b). It is not, however, a lack 
of fault as a matter of law as to the defendant. A plaintiff 
cannot fail to prosecute one defendant and thereby force another 
defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's proportionate share. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the lower court, 
because plaintiff did not resist the motion, and particularly in 
light of the fact that a factual question existed as to Norton's 
fault, if it granted Norton's summary judgment, should have 
allowed the jury to apportion Norton's fault. This is so because 
the summary judgment should have been granted because of a lack 
of resistance, not a lack of fault as a matter of law. 
It is true that the motion was resisted by the defendant. 
However, the defendant did so out of an abundance of caution. It 
did so, also, on only a few days preparation, since the plaintiff 
had intended on filing a brief, and even obtained an extension 
for filing, before deciding not to file at the last moment. 
Twice, NSI requested additional time from the Court. NSI's 
position was and still is that it had no obligation to resist the 
motion and that because the plaintiff made no good faith 
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opposition to the motion, the judgment was not because of "lack 
of fault" and Norton should still have its fault determined. The 
court declined to take that action. 
At a minimum, the open courts provision, due process, and 
equal protection require that NSI be given a "full and fair 
opportunity" to litigate the issues of Norton's proportionate 
fault, including indemnity owed by Norton as an upstream 
manufacturer. That was not afforded in the court below because 
(1) the lack of opportunity as a procedural matter; 
(2) the Court's several erroneous rulings including 
(a) that Norton owed no duty to plaintiff 
(b) categorizing Norton as a component part 
manufacturer rather than a container manufacturer 
(3) ruling there was no material issue of fact as to whether 
Norton's product was defective or negligently designed. 
(4) The procedural concerns that plaintiff's expert was not 
available to summarize the issues, and hiring a expert by NSI to 
prove the case against Norton was untenable also, since it would 
amount to admission of selling a dangerous product by NSI. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Sullivan, allowing one party 
to pay more than their proportionate share of fault is uone of 
the major evils of joint and several liability" Sullivan supra 
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at 880. The holding in Sullivan was premised on the express 
finding that this would not occur. Sullivan, supra, held 
...that D and RG, which was dismissed pursuant to 
an adjudication on the merits, may not be included 
in apportionment. D and RG was dismissed due to a 
lack of fault as a matter of law. Thus D and RG's 
exclusion will not subject remaining defendants to 
potential liability for damages in excess of their 
proportionate fault. 
Sullivan supra at 884. However, the onerous result warned 
against in Sullivan is exactly what will happen in this case if 
this court allows the lower court's ruling to stand. 
It should be noted that not only has this inequity 
occurred in the present case, but there is an incentive for it to 
occur often in the future. The plaintiff in the present case 
declined to oppose Norton's motion. And why should plaintiff's 
counsel oppose a motion, as long as the jury cannot attribute 
fault to the dismissed party. The plaintiff's counsel in this 
case stated at the hearing "...it literally doesn't make any 
difference to me if it is both these defendants at trial or one." 
(R p. 21, 1. 13-50) . 
Often times it is in a plaintiff's interest to have only one 
defendant at trial. Multiple defendants mean multiple cross-
examinations, multiple opening arguments, multiple closing 
arguments, multiple resources, etc. Sometimes several 
44 
defendants, each of whose fault contributed to the plaintiff's 
injury, don't stand on equal ground. Perhaps one defendant has 
strong witnesses, a deep pocket, aggressive counsel, etc. Under, 
the trial judge's interpretation of Sullivan, plaintiff's council 
can build a case against the weakest defendant, stand by idly 
while the other defendants move for summary judgment, and force 
the remaining defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's 
proportionate share of the verdict, citing the Sullivan case. 
Obviously, due process, the open courts clause, and 
fairness require that the defendants, at some point in the 
litigation process, have the right and standing to have the 
proportionate fault of the co-defendant determined, if the 
plaintiff refuses to pursue the claim (as has occurred here) or 
pursues the claim haphazardly. 
B. Use of Sullivan and issue preclusion to afford "full and fair 
opportunity" to litigate. 
Somewhere, all defendants are entitled to a "full and fair 
opportunity" to litigate their claims. In the present case this 
can occur in several ways. First, the lower court should have 
ruled that Norton's fault be determined by the jury. Plaintiff's 
failure to make a good faith response to a defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is not a "determination of lack of fault as a 
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matter of law," even through it acts as an adjudication on the 
merits. Sullivan anticipates this distinction. 
Second, if no "full and fair opportunity" occurs, such as 
where the lower court erroneously declines to have a defendant's 
fault determined (as here), the offended party can file separate 
suit. This is anticipated by rules developed regarding issue 
preclusion 
It is well settled that in an action between a plaintiff and 
a defendant, a final judgment on the merits is binding on that 
plaintiff and defendant. IB Moore's Federal Practice 2nd 0.411 [2] 
1994. The concept of issue preclusion becomes somewhat more 
obscure when more than one defendant enters the picture. The 
issue then becomes, to what extent and under what circumstances 
is a defendant bound by a judgment against a co-defendant. 
Generally, the courts hold that the co-defendant is bound only 
when there has been a "full and fair adjudication." 
The extent to which relitigation of issues decided between 
co-parties and their common adversary is precluded by 
collateral estoppel in a later suit between the co-parties 
is a question to which there has been no uniform answer. So 
long as it was generally assumed that collateral estoppel 
rested on a showing that the issue had once been litigated 
between the same parties, it followed that to support the 
claim of estoppel, it must appear not only that the party 
asserting the estoppel and the person against whom it was 
asserted were parties to the prior litigation, but also that 
the question had been agitated between them and determined, 
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or put another way, that as to the issue involved they were 
not only parties to the same case, but adverse parties on 
that issue. 
Id. "The reason for the rule is that one should not be bound by 
a judgment except to the extent that he or someone representing 
him had an opportunity to litigate the issue adjudicated with the 
party who seeks to invoke the judgment against him." See also, 
Dobbins v. Barnes, 204 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1953) 
Although the situation presented by this case arose under 
the Liability Reform Act the principals regarding due process 
still apply. In other words, in order to be bound by a finding 
that the co-defendant is not at fault, that finding must have 
occurred under circumstances where the defendants were 
sufficiently adverse to each other that the defendant had an 
opportunity to actually "litigate the issue adjudicated". That 
circumstance certainly cannot be said to exist in this case where 
the plaintiff, by his own admission did virtually nothing to 
assert the liability of the co-defendant and where, the 
appellant, because of the trial courts rulings was not able to do 
so. 
The Liability Reform Act specifically abolished 
contribution, substituting instead a right to have each 
defendant's ("defendant" includes non-parties" proportionate 
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fault determined. It is clear that this cause of action exists, 
as the statute states 
a person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is 
a party to the litigation, may join as a 
defendant, ... any person other than a person 
immune from suit who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for which 
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-41(1) (1994). Thus, current 
practice allows defendants to file a third-party complaint 
against other entities, and have their proportionate fault 
determined. Rule 13(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
makes clear that cross claims are not compulsory. 
C. Summary of Procedural Issues. 
In summary, the summary judgment should be reversed, and the 
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. With 
the summary judgment reversed, the pleadings can be amended, and 
the proportionate fault of Norton be determined. 
As a second option, NSI should have an opportunity to fully 
and fairly litigate these issues in a separate suit against 
Norton to have its proportionate fault determined. NSI has the 
right to have Norton's proportionate fault determined. If a 
defendant moves for summary judgment, and the plaintiff does not 
resist, co-defendant should not be obligated to step into 
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plaintiff's shoes, hire experts and present a case against the 
defendant likely admitting liability against itself in the 
process. If plaintiff fails to meet its burden against one 
defendant, and a co-defendant declines to step forward and take 
plaintiff's burden upon itself, the defendant may not have its 
fault determined at the original trial. If perchance the co-
defendant were to be found liable, co-defendant would then have 
the option, if it chose, to file a separate suit, and have the 
defendant's proportionate fault determined. This was the process 
before the Liability Reform Act. Years of law have refined its 
equities. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erroneously ruled on both legal duty and in 
factual findings. This Court should reverse the summary judgment 
and remand to the trial court. 
Dated this 29th day of March, 1995. 
POWELL Sc LANG, P.C. 
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BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: In the Packer matter, are there any 
3 matters to be resolved by the Court except Norton's motion for 
4 summary judgment? 
5 MR. WINEGAR: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Let's call it, and we are ready to go. 
7 Sherman D. Packer vs. National Service Industries, 920902466. 
8 Counsel will state an appearance. 
9 MR. KING: Colin King and Alan Mortensen for the 
10 plaintiff. 
11 MR. BELNAP: Paul Belnap for Norton. 
12 MR. WINEGAR: And Todd Winegar for NSI. 
13 THE COURT: You may proceed on the defendant Norton's 
14 motion for summary judgment. The Court has read all the 
15 pleadings in support of, in opposition to, and the reply 
16 memorandum, and is ready to hear argument. 
17 MR. BELNAP: With your Honor's indication that you 
18 have read the pleadings, I will try to be brief on the facts. 
19 Perhaps I could go over a couple of points which would bring 
20 into focus the issues which we have here today. 
21 What we are dealing with, Judge, is a seven-gallon 
22 steel pail that is manufactured by my client. I would like to 
23 show your Honor some pictures of this pail, if I could. May I 
24 approach? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BELNAP: This is some photographs of the pail, 
your Honor, that is made by Norton. Norton has received 
directions from Mr. Winegar's client, Zep. They will call in. 
They will make a bulk order. They gave my client directions in 
its litho process the color that they wanted the pail painted 
and the name that they wanted to put on the pail. 
My client then makes the pail. They make the cover, 
which is what we call the lid, the yellow part, and they 
install into the cover a screw cap and lid type material from 
International Machine and Tool, which is a party to this case. 
This is received as an installed component from International 
Machine and Tool, just like this. It is not touched or 
anything else by Norton, other than a machine takes it, places 
it on the top of this yellow lid, and crimps it onto the lid. 
These pails are then shipped on pallets in bulk to 
Mr. Winegar's client, who then makes the decision, themselves, 
as to what products they are going to put into the pail, and 
employees of Mr. Winegar's client fill the pail with a variety 
of products, and then clamp the lid down. 
In that process, if I could approach again, your 
Honor, we went down to Zep's facility in San Jose, where this 
particular pail was manufactured, and at that facility they 
make a variety of products. Cleaners, degreasers, all sorts of 
things are put into these pails. And they have a shelf-type 
system on the wall that has a number of different paper labels 
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1 that are put on the pail, depending on what kind of product is 
2 put into it. This Exhibit 3 from the Fineman deposition is the 
3 paper label, a copy of it, that was put on this pail. This was 
4 designed, written and attached by Zep to the pail, talking 
5 about the high-foam degreaser, and giving what directions they 
6 felt were appropriate to the consumer in opening or in using 
7 this product. 
8 It is undisputed that my client was never approached. 
9 No one ever talked to my client about what would be put in the 
10 product — or in the container, number one; on or the label 
11 that Zep chose to use in putting on the container, and the 
12 directions that it would use. 
13 We have taken the depositions of the two people at 
14 Zep, who are, number one, Mr. Fineman, who was their chief 
15 engineer in charge of research and development, was 
16 instrumental in developing the degreaser that went into this 
17 container. He was in that capacity from 1970 to approximately 
18 up through 1990. He is now in charge of all of Zep!s 
19 litigation. 
20 His deposition was taken, and in his deposition he 
21 was asked if he knew of any information that my client was ever 
22 given that this pail needed to be a pressure vessel. In other 
23 words, a vessel that could handle pressure gradients and 
24 release any pressure and handle the containing of pressure. 
25 And he indicated no. He was asked if he could see any problem 
or defect with this pail. He indicated no. We are not talking 
just about a lay employee. This is a Ph.D. engineer from Zep!s 
own company. 
He indicated on page 82 of his deposition that his 
company had continued to use this same type of pail, and were 
now two plus years post accident when this deposition was 
taken. His company made a decision that on some pails they 
would buy from my client and other manufacturers, they would 
use whatfs called this inner seal, and some they wouldn't. 
They made that decision. 
He indicated, in response to my question, I asked 
him, "Do these particular pails need to be a pressure vessel?" 
"No, not that I am aware of." He went on to state, after 
discussion with counsel, where Mr. Winegar indicated that there 
may be a component of temperature differential that could raise 
vapor pressure, but not in a significant amount, quote, "I 
presume you are talking about." 
Then I asked the question, "And within those 
parameters, do you believe these particular pails of the type 
that Mr. King has shown you in photographs are fit for the 
purpose of this chemical that you put into them? 
"A. Yes, they are." 
We have taken the deposition of Spencer Graham, who 
was the plant manager at the San Jose facility, and he himself 
is an engineer, as I recall, has worked for Zep for a number of 
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1 years, both back in Atlanta at their headquarters and in San 
2 Jose, and I asked him the question, "Who determined whether the 
3 Norton container, with the high-foam degreaser, should have the 
4 metal seal in the cap, or not?" And he said Atlanta, meaning 
5 Zepfs headquarters in Atlanta. 
6 He confirmed that the same containers have continued 
7 to be ordered, using the variety of different products in them 
8 from my client. 
9 "To your knowledge, did anyone at Zep ever indicate 
10 to anyone from BW Norton that the materials that would be 
11 placed in any of these steel pails would be such as would 
12 create any vapor pressure or head space pressure? 
13 "Well, of course, we didn't, because it was not a 
14 problem. To my knowledge, we are getting the same pail now as 
15 then. 
16 "Do you know who at Zep was involved in telling 
17 Norton how they wanted the pail painted on the outside, 
18 lettered and designed? 
19 "A. Well, of course, that design dates back a 
20 number of years to when we moved out here, but it is pretty 
21 much the same. 
22 "And it is kind of a generic design so that these 
23 paper labels can then be applied to the pail, depending upon 
24 what is put in it? 
25 "A. That is correct." 
1 Given that factual background, your Honor, this is 
2 basically where we find ourselves in the case at this point in 
3 time. Mr. King has indicated that, through his expert, and as 
4 we discussed with the Court, he does not have evidence that the 
5 pail manufactured by my client when it left our facility in 
6 this condition as, simply, an empty pail, with no paper label 
7 on it, with no knowledge on our part what was going to be put 
8 into it, and we are not the one packaging it, he has no 
9 evidence that in that condition the pail was in a defective 
10 state. 
11 His expert has indicated that, in his opinion, there 
12 was approximately five pounds of pressure in head space of the 
13 pail, and that!s based on testing a like pail, from the exact 
14 same batch. And it is his opinion, that based upon that build-
15 up of pressure, this inner seal popped out, and hit his client 
16 in the eye. But there is no opinions in his testimony which 
17 would indicate that the pail itself is defective. 
18 As I have recited for you, the testimony from 
19 Mr. Winegar's own witnesses indicate that they have no 
20 knowledge or belief that the pail is defective. They have not 
21 consulted with us about what warnings should be on the pail, or 
22 asked us if the warnings that they chose to use, which I showed 
23 your Honor, Exhibit 3 from the Fineman deposition, is 
24 sufficient. We have not been consulted, whatsoever. 
25 Now, Mr. Winegarfs approach in this case, if the 
1 Court determines that Zep's response, although untimely, that 
2 you will go ahead and accept their response as put in, in the 
3 untimely fashion, if the Court determines to hear this on the 
4 merits and get past that procedural stage, then the question 
5 becomes, your Honor, in their approach, they have taken a 
6 smokescreen to try and create a factual question from arguing 
7 various interpretations of Dr. de Nevers' deposition testimony, 
8 which, taken, do not support the fact that there is a fact 
9 question. 
10 But, more importantly, getting to the bottom line on 
11 a motion for summary judgment, your Honor, as a matter of law, 
12 has the decision to determine whether my client had a duty. 
13 That is a legal question. And under the situation at hand, 
14 where we build the pail, we are doing so purely to the 
15 specifications given to us by Mr. Winegar. We have a number of 
16 different types of pails that we can build, a number of 
17 different types of closure devices that we can offer to a 
18 customer. We are delivering this to their specifications, and 
19 no consultation about what labels are going to be put on it 
20 after it leaves our facility, depending on the product they put 
21 in. 
22 As a matter of law, we have cited to your Honor cases 
23 that under this scenario we don't have a duty, as a component 
24 manufacturer, to the plaintiff in this case. We don't have a 
25 duty to Zep, under these circumstances, since there is no 
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1 contribution in this state, your Honor. And the plaintiff 
2 would have on the verdict form, if this motion was granted, the 
3 parties that this Court determines have a legal duty to the 
4 plaintiff. And we submit, your Honor, under the state of the 
5 record, as it exists today, that the only person or entity with 
6 a legal duty to the plaintiff is Zep, the person who received 
7 the container, packaged it, decided what label was going to be 
8 put on it, shipped it# and had control of all of those facets, 
9 of which we did not have control. 
10 Thank you, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. Response? Let's talk about 
12 the procedural problem first. The Court noted that the 
13 response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment was 
14 several weeks late. Explain what mitigating circumstances, if 
15 any, exist in that regard. 
16 MR. WINEGAR: I think this is a very unusual case 
17 procedurally, and, frankly, one of the most interesting I have 
18 seen in a long time. We did not respond to their motion for 
19 summary judgment because we weren't going to. We didn't think 
20 we have the burden to. We are still not sure, when we were 
21 told that the plaintiff was not going to respond, we responded 
22 within a few days. I think I was told like on a Thursday that 
23 the plaintiff would not be responding to the motion for summary 
24 judgment, and the next Monday or Tuesday we responded. 
25 The reason that we did not respond immediately is 
because we donft think that it is our burden to respond. We 
didn't sue Norton. We didn't pursue a case against them. As 
they have aptly pointed out, we don't think that this pail is 
defective. 
THE COURT: Do you object to their motion for summary 
judgment? 
MR. WINEGAR: I take this stance. I don't object, if 
Norton is still on the verdict form. But — 
THE COURT: Let's talk about that for just a moment, 
because that raises an interesting question. Supposing that 
the Court found that there was no expert testimony establishing 
any defect in the pail, that they did not participate in any of 
the labeling, the product was placed into the container after 
it left the hands of the Norton company, and granted the motion 
for summary judgment. What would be the position of the 
plaintiff and your client, when it came time to send the matter 
in to the jury? 
MR. WINEGAR: I think that the Scoular case governs 
that, that Norton could not be on the verdict form, if you 
found everything that you just found. But I don't think that 
that's necessarily what you have to find. In other words, what 
has happened here is there are three defendants in this case, 
and let's assume, for the sake of argument, that each of them 
have one third of the fault. If the plaintiff pursues the case 
against one defendant, and totally ignores the other two, it is 
10 
1 too expensive, they don't want to do it, they are a third at 
2 fault, but they are not going to pursue the case, what that 
3 makes is, the first defendant, it obligates them to go out and 
4 construct the plaintiffs1 case for them against the other two 
5 defendants, and if they fail to do so, then they would have — 
6 that first defendant would have to pay 100 percent of the 
7 fault. They would have to pay the second and third defendants' 
8 fault. That was never intended by the Tort Reform Act. In 
9 fact, its specific reason for being drafted was that each 
10 defendant pays its own fault. 
11 Now, we think that since the plaintiff didn't respond 
12 to the motion for summary judgment, that perhaps the correct 
13 result is that if Norton is dismissed, and I think that it is 
14 clear that Norton is at fault, as I will show in a minute, but 
15 since the defendant didn't respond, they should be on the 
16 verdict form. The Schuler case says you are only not on the 
17 verdict form if the dismissal was due to lack of fault, and, 
18 obviously, if Norton is dismissed because of a lack of 
19 response, they are still on the jury verdict form. Here I 
20 think that's what it is. It is not a lack of fault. I will 
21 explain in a minute why Norton is at fault. But it is a lack 
22 of response. So that's why I think this is an unusual case. 
23 We, as another defendant, are responding to this 
24 motion for summary judgment. If that is our duty, and if the 
25 Court wants to grant summary judgment, we request additional 
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1 time to build the case. But I don't think that that's 
2 necessary; first, because I don't think it is our burden. And 
3 if Norton is dismissed because of failure to respond to the 
4 motion, and as long as it is clear they will still be on the 
5 verdict form, we don't object to that. 
6 THE COURT: What is your response? 
7 MR. BELNAP: If we are dismissed under the Sullivan 
8 vs. Scoular Grain case, which was my case up at the Supreme 
9 Court, the Court — that was a case certified from federal 
10 court with two questions. Can you compare the fault of a 
11 nonparty, immune employer? That was the fir3t question. 
12 The second question is, can you compare the fault of 
13 a dismissed party? In that case, Denver & Rio Grande Railroad 
14 had been dismissed by Judge Greene on a previous motion for 
15 summary judgment on the merits. The Utah Supreme Court 
16 answered the second question, that if a party has been 
17 dismissed, their fault cannot be compared, because they have 
18 been determined, as a matter of law, to be appropriately 
19 dismissed. 
20 So what the plaintiff is arguing, to me, doesn't seem 
21 appropriate. Maybe that's not my argument. But that's in 
22 response to your Honor's question. It is correct the 
23 comparative fault act only asks them to pay their share of 
24 fault. That's all they are responsible for. How a trial 
25 proceeds in the shifting of duties of going forward with the 
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1 evidence and burdens of persuasion and burdens of proof is 
2 something they are always going to face, your Honor, in any 
3 trial. To say this is now shifting it to them, they are only 
4 responsible to show that they weren't at fault. If you dismiss 
5 my client, it does not take away from them any arguments about 
6 their product. 
7 THE COURT: That is true. But supposing, as Counsel 
8 has argued, there are empty chairs in the trial, and Counsel 
9 says, We may be at fault, but there are other people who are at 
10 fault in this lawsuit, that the plaintiff has elected not to go 
11 after, or for some reason the jury need not know they are not 
12 involved in this trial, but what we want you to do when you go 
13 into the jury room is decide 'v-v._ .e. or not Plaintiff has 
14 established their case; and, if so, which of the defendants are 
15 at fault, and what their percentage of fault is. 
16 If that were permitted in this trial, Norton would 
17 not in any way be exposed to a judgment. They would simply be 
18 a factor utilized by another defendant in their hope of 
19 reducing, somewhat, the other defendant's liability. 
20 MR. BELNAP: But, your Honor, I submit, respectfully, 
21 that would not be appropriate. This is probably more 
22 Mr. King's argument. Let me state why I think, so it doesn't 
23 appear that I am trying to mislead the Court. If this Court, 
24 just as in any case, determines, for legal reasons, that Norton 
25 is not liable, then they are not an empty chair to point at. 
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1 There has been a legal determination that Norton should not be 
2 a party in this case. At that point in time, Mr. Winegar can 
3 point his finger any direction he wants, put on any evidence as 
4 to how the accident occurred, causation, anything else. But 
5 for the jury to determine that Norton was at fault, there would 
6 not be a legal basis, because your Honor would have determined, 
7 as a matter of law, Norton did not have a duty to warn, as 
8 Mr. Winegar seems to imply in his memoranda, even though he 
9 wants it both ways, that the pail isn't defective, but maybe we 
10 should have warned, there would not be that duty, you would 
11 have already decided that question. 
12 THE COURT: The Court agrees with your position. And 
13 it brings us full circle to the question the Court raised 
14 earlier. Procedurally, if the Court finds that the response or 
15 the objection to Norton's motion for summary judgment was 
16 untimely, and disregards it, then we do not get to the merits 
17 of the motion, do we, procedurally, the motion is unopposed, 
18 and it is granted. Isn't that the status of the law? 
19 MR. BELNAP: The status, timing-wise, is that when 
20 Mr. Winegar says that he learned the plaintiff wasn't going to 
21 respond on the Thursday, it was already a week past the 
22 response due date. Then he responded the next week. So we 
23 are, I think, pretty close, if not at, two weeks over the time 
24 for having responded, with no telephone calls to our office, or 
25 any other communication requesting additional time. 
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THE COURT: The Court would like to hear argument 
from other counsel on the procedural question that has been 
raised in the reply memo. 
MR. KING: Thank you, your Honor. I think it would 
be inappropriate to resolve this matter on a procedural issue. 
In fairness to Mr. Winegar, both these counsel, what I did was 
study the summary judgment motion, talked to my expert. I made 
a decision that I would rather have this go to a decision on 
the merits. And if the Court denied the case on the merits, 
then I would have both parties in front of the jury. If the 
Court — assuming we go to trial. If the Court granted the 
motion, I would have the trial against Mr. Winegarfs client, 
and he wouldn't be able to point at an empty chair. 
I told Mr. Belnap sometime near the last portion of 
my response time that I intended not — well, I told him — I 
asked him, first of all, for an extension of a week, and he 
granted that to me. It was oral. It was not done, I don't 
believe, in any writing, was it? 
MR. BELNAP: No. But that's a correct statement. 
MR. KING: He gave me about a week extension. Near 
the end of that week extension, as I recall, I think I told 
Paul Belnap I wasn't going to file a motion — or response. I 
know I told Mr. Winegar I wasn't going to file a response. 
Whereupon, he had a small fit, and said he was going to file 
one. I said, fine, go ahead. So, in fairness to Mr. Winegar, 
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1 he didn't know that I was not going to file a response, I don't 
2 think, until after my response time was finished. 
3 THE COURT: Let's assume that there was no other 
4 defendant in the lawsuit, and you elected not to oppose the 
5 motion for summary judgment. Procedurally, the Court would be 
6 mandated by law to grant the motion, would it not? 
7 MR. KING: Yes, I think that's correct, on the 
8 merits. 
9 THE COURT: Let's add the other component, and that 
10 is a co-defendant, who steps in, basically, and takes the 
11 plaintiff's laboring oar in the matter. Plaintiff does not 
12 want to object to the motion for summary judgment. 
13 Co-defendant now is basically asserting the plaintiff's 
14 position. 
15 MR. KING: I think that's correct, your Honor, 
16 THE COURT: Should we extend any more leeway, 
17 legally, to a co-defendant, than we would have extended to the 
18 plaintiff? 
19 MR. KING: I would think not. That's why I come to 
20 the conclusion that the Court would be compelled to grant the 
21 motion for summary judgment on the merits. 
22 THE COURT: I think you are right. 
23 MR. KING: If it is going to grant it. And I think 
24 whether the Court grants the motion for summary judgment on the 
25 merits, or not, certainly is up to the latitude of the Court. 
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The Court can ignore the procedure irregularity, treat 
Mr. Winegar as if in my shoes, and grant the motion or deny the 
motion on the merits, should the Court desire. Certainly 
within the Courtfs power. 
THE COURT: Your position is absolutely correct. And 
in the Court's opinion — 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, first of all, let me quote 
from the Schuler case, because I think that the Schuler case — 
THE COURT: Whatfs the date on that case? 
MR. WINEGAR: It is filed April 22, 1993. I presume 
that is not the date — 
THE COURT: Is that a Supreme Court decision? 
MR. BELNAP: Yes. Here are the points certified by 
Judge Greene. The second question is that issue of whether you 
can compare the fault of a dismissed party. 
THE COURT: Go ahead now, and direct the Court to the 
page and the paragraph. 
MR. WINEGAR: It is on page 11. Your Honor, I 
have — our office was also involved in that. So the copy I 
have is the one sent to us, and not the one published. So my 
page may not — it is right near the end of the main opinion. 
Let me, first of all, explain two things. First of 
all, it is our theory, NSIfs theory, that the plaintiff hit 
himself in the eye with a knife. But that may not necessarily 
be believed by the jury. And if it is not believed, if they 
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believe Plaintiff's story, then Norton is at fault, and not 
NSI. I can explain that in a minute. 
Second of all, we were told that Mr. King was going 
to file a response to this. 
THE COURT: Did he tell you that? 
MR. WINEGAR: Yes, he did. And he indicated he was 
going to file it. In fact, I was going to send him some 
information over to incorporate in it. Then near the end he 
indicated he would not be filing it, and if I wanted to file 
anything, that I needed to, which I did a few days later. 
MR. KING: He is right. I forgot that. I originally 
said I was going to do something. But I said I had some 
questions. I had some doubts. He said he had some material 
that would be helpful to me. I said send it over. It didn!t 
come over. But we talked again. That's when I indicated I 
wasnf t. 
MR. WINEGAR: So if this is going to be dismissed on 
a procedural basis, I would think it would not be appropriate, 
with Counsel cooperating like this, to do it just because a 
deadline has passed. The procedural basis that I think is the 
more interesting question, and I must admit to the Court it is 
not clear, that is that the Supreme Court has not decided this, 
but I think that the result is fair, and that is the Schuler 
case says never — it says that, nevertheless, we hold that 
D&RG, which was dismissed pursuant to an adjudication on the 
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merits, and those are the key words, may not be included in 
apportionment. D&RG was dismissed due to a lack of fault, as a 
matter of law. If that's the circumstance, I think it is clear 
Norton cannot be on the verdict form, if the Court looks at the 
motion, looks at the arguments, and decides, as a matter of 
law, Norton has no fault. They are not on the verdict form. 
But in the prior paragraph to that, it says a 
plaintiff may have legal grounds for a cause of action against 
a defendant, and the defendant may be dismissed due, for 
example, the assertion of a successful affirmative defense. 
Thus the Act's definition of fault does not necessarily 
preclude the apportionment of fault of nonparties. So if the 
Court dismisses them, even though there is a question, based 
on — there is a disputed fact of their fault, but dismisses 
them on a procedural ground, because of nonresponse, then I 
think it is appropriate that they are on the jury verdict form. 
THE COURT: What's your response to that? 
MR. KING: May I respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Let's hear from both of you. 
MR. WINEGAR: So I think that is it. As I would be 
glad to explain, I think if Plaintiff's story is believed, that 
Norton is at fault. 
As far as the procedural issue, I think it is an 
interesting issue, whether the plaintiff can force a defendant 
to come forward, hire experts, and go prove a case against the 
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1 other defendants. 
2 MR. KING: Your Honor, I haven't forced any defendant 
3 to do anything, I made a decision to not oppose motion for 
4 summary judgment. I could have made an opposition, and maybe 
5 the outcome will be different. I don't know what the outcome 
6 is going to be. It would be a penalization of my client for 
7 the Court to decide to dismiss this case on the procedural 
8 technicality that I didn't file a response. I made a response, 
9 and I will say in open court I made no response to the motion 
10 formally, because I thought it lacked — it had merit. 
11 THE COURT: The motion for summary judgment had 
12 merit? 
13 MR. KING: Yes. My client should not be penalized by 
14 my not responding, which would happen if the Court then ignored 
15 the motion on its merits, and left this defendant in the case 
16 as someone to point the blame at by the other side. That would 
17 be gross misjustice — miscarriage of justice, it seems to me, 
18 your Honor. I think that when the Court finds itself having a 
19 motion for summary judgment presented to it, then the Court has 
20 an obligation, under the rules, to decide the motion on its 
21 merits. I didn't respond. I don't think that puts this 
22 setting any differently than if I had responded. I haven't 
23 violated any rules by not responding, have I? I don't think I 
24 have to respond. 
25 THE COURT: The plaintiff could have gone fishing 
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today, and filed no response prior to today1s hearing. The 
defendant would have come in. The Court would have granted the 
motion on the lack of opposition to the summary judgment, on 
the merits, based on the pleadings, and it would have been 
over. 
MR. KING: And Mr. Winegar is trying to be in a 
position of having been penalized somehow, but he is simply 
not. It simply is his problem. I have got claims against his 
client. But it doesnft make him in any worse situation if this 
case is dismissed against Norton. Frankly, it doesn't matter 
to me. It literally doesn't matter to me. That's why I didn't 
file a response. I didn't file a response, because I am 
convinced there is no possible claim against Norton. It 
literally doesn't make any difference to me if it is both these 
defendants at trial, or one. But Mr. Winegar simply can't 
claim prejudice by this procedure, any more than he could claim 
prejudice by him being forced to argue that the plaintiff's 
sister somehow caused the accident. He can claim anybody 
caused the accident. But once the Court is faced with a 
summary judgment proceeding on someone that has been brought 
before the Court, I think the Court is compelled to decide that 
on the merits. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I think that there are two 
fallacies there. First of all, he indicates it doesn't matter 
to the plaintiff what happens, whether Norton is in there or 
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1 not. 
2 THE COURT: He argued just the opposite. He said it 
3 would be blatantly unfair for the Court to dismiss the case on 
4 a procedural basis, and then have Norton on the verdict form, 
5 because it would dilute or water down any judgment that the 
6 plaintiff gets against your client, if you can say your client 
7 was only 30 percent liable, and the empty chair was another 20 
8 percent liable, and between them there is 50 percent liability 
9 on the defendants' side, and the plaintiff gets nothing. 
10 MR. WINEGAR: I agree with that. I guess it is the 
11 other side of the coin that I am looking at. That is it is 
12 blatantly unfair to my client to go along here and just a 
13 couple of days before — actually, a couple of days after the 
14 extension to file a motion for summary judgment, find out that 
15 there is none, and presuming, for a minute, that Norton is at 
16 fault, and I think I can show that quite clearly, then my 
17 client has to pay all of Norton's fault, just because of this 
18 procedural error, that I didn't know the plaintiff wasn't going 
19 to file, and that I have not gone and hired experts against 
20 Norton. I don't think Norton is at fault. But if Plaintiff's 
21 version is believed, then, under those circumstances, then it 
22 is. It is literally forcing me not to only put on my case that 
23 the plaintiff hit himself in the eye with a knife, but also to 
24 go and defend Norton's case, or the case against the plaintiff, 
25 of hiring experts to prove that Norton was at fault. I take 
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part of the plaintifffs case, and have to prove Norton is at 
fault, just in case the plaintiff's story is believed. And so, 
you know, I mean, I agree it is unfair to Plaintiff's client, 
but it is unfair to my client, too. It is a very unusual 
procedural issue, and maybe, because of that, we ought to go on 
and decide it on the merits. But if it is decided on a 
procedural issue, I think that issue should be that we had no 
notice, that we were supposed to put on Plaintiff's case, and 
we should either be given more time so we can put on 
Plaintiff's case against Norton, or they should be on the jury 
verdict form. 
THE COURT: All right, anything else from anybody? 
MR. BELNAP: Just to briefly say, your Honor, this 
isn't trying to catch somebody in a trap type motion. 
THE COURT: The Court has not detected any collusion 
of any kind. I think the parties were all up front with their 
respective positions. 
MR. BELNAP: This motion was made right after 
discovery was cut off, your Honor. His talking about the 
burdens are not unlike what any defendant would face in a case, 
anyway. 
THE COURT: Do all counsel submit? 
MR. BELNAP: Yes. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, on the procedural matter, 
we do. But we still have our response to the motion. I would 
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1 like to explain that, because I think that it is clear, from 
2 Plaintiff's expert, Dr. de Nevers, that it was Norton's can 
3 that caused this injury, and not any contents. 
4 THE COURT: Let's think outloud for a minute, so that 
5 you understand what the Court is inclined to do, and then the 
6 Court will give you an opportunity to respond to its advisory 
7 ruling. The Court is inclined to disregard the opposition to 
8 Norton's motion for summary judgment filed by National Service 
9 Industries. And the reason being that it was not timely filed. 
10 It was two weeks out. Therefore, the status of the record is 
11 that there is a motion for summary judgment by the defendant 
12 Norton. The plaintiff has not responded. And the Court is 
13 inclined to find that, based on the merits of the motion, that 
14 Norton is entitled to summary judgment. 
15 Now, would anyone like to argue anything in response 
16 to that? 
17 MR. WINEGAR: I would like to argue on the merits. I 
18 think that my client has no fault in not responding. We 
19 thought the plaintiff was responding. We responded within a 
20 matter of days, once we found out the plaintiff was not 
21 responding. My client is severely penalized, having to pay for 
22 all of Norton's fault, which could be tens, maybe hundreds of 
23 thousands of dollars, just because we were told that the 
24 plaintiff was going to respond, and, therefore, didn't respond 
25 ourselves, until we were told they were not. I don't think 
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1 that is a fair result. I don't think that the defendants 
2 normally respond to a motion for summary judgment of J. : ..-.-: 
3 defendant. It is rare. I can't even recall having seen this 
4 circumstance, where the plaintiff didn't respond, and once they 
5 didn't, then another defendant had to. 
6 THE COURT: What does the Court have as an 
7 alternative, legally? 
8 MR. WINEGAR: I think that the alternative is to 
9 indicate that, because of the circumstances, the Court will 
10 consider our response to the motion for summary judgment, will 
11 listen, the Court has read the briefs, will listen to the 
12 argument on the merits, and make a decision on the merits. 
13 THE COURT: Then Norton cries foul, saying that the 
14 law is clear and unequivocal that there was a time designated 
15 for response, or an objection to the motion for summary 
16 judgment, there was no time in response; therefore, the Court 
17 is required to consider the motion on its merits, grant it, and 
18 award summary judgment. That's Norton's position. 
19 MR. BELNAP: Well, that's as we have argued it, that 
20 is a part of the position, your Honor. But I think maybe 
21 putting this case into scenario and into sequence may be 
2 2 helpful, as well. When we took Dr. de Nevers' deposition, when 
23 Mr. Winegar took his deposition months ago, at that point in 
24 time Mr. King stepped forward in a candid manner with both 
25 counsel and said, I don't see any evidence against Norton to 
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1 keep them in this case. And I am willing to let Norton out of 
2 this case, so long as Mr, Winegar does not try to point the 
3 finger at them at trial, 
4 Mr. Winegar would not agree to do that at that point 
5 in time. So, basically, he was put in the position at that 
6 point, better get your case together and your experts together 
7 and be aware that this thing is coming down the track. So we 
8 let discovery go by. We make our motion on the merits. Your 
9 Honor is now faced with a motion before you, on the merits, 
10 which you can read and determine, as a matter of law, based on 
11 the briefing that existed, that it is well taken, and grant it. 
12 THE COURT: And the briefing is without opposition. 
13 MR. BELNAP: Right. But your Honor still has the 
14 discretion to look at it. I would admit that. And on the 
15 merits of the briefing, that it i3 well taken, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: And consider the motion in opposition by 
17 NSI? 
18 MR. BELNAP: Well, that's a decision you will have to 
19 make. We don't think that's appropriate, your Honor. But if 
20 you decide you want to consider that, I am saying, on the 
21 merits, this is a good-faith motion that ought to be granted, 
22 as a matter of law, for the reasons I argued at the outset. 
23 MR. WINEGAR: And, your Honor, on that, I think that 
24 there is no one has been hurt, none of the parties, none of the 
25 attorneys that are hurt by having a decision on the merits. In 
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fact, we have been very cooperative amongst each other. There 
was a — some informal telephone calls that were made to obtain 
an extension to answer, and another informal call to me, to 
indicate that they would not answer. And if this Court rules 
that those informal — this informal cooperation that we have 
all had will go for naught, and that there are deadlines that, 
unless met, I think that it ruins the cooperation, from now on, 
we will have to start writing letters and say if you don't 
respond by such and such a date, then I am going to respond. 
Please let me know your intentions and file the appropriate 
documents with the court. 
THE COURT: Your position — your argument is between 
counsel, not between you and the Court. The Court had nothing 
to do with the granting of extensions or relaxing the order for 
pretrial order in this matter. It is now a co-defendant who is 
asserting that there was no timely response. The Court is not, 
on its own motion, making that opposition. 
MR. WINEGAR: You are absolutely right. I guess what 
I am saying is two things. First of all, if that is the 
Court's position, that if something is a couple of days late, 
that it will be stricken, from now on our firm and all other 
firms will not cooperate like this. We will always send things 
to you directly, asking for extensions, getting stipulations, 
filing them. If that's the way the Court wants it to happen, 
then that's great, and we will do that from now on. 
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1 THE COURT: The Court is not saying thatfs its 
2 position at all. The Court is simply saying that, in the reply 
3 memo, Norton is saying there was not a timely objection on the 
4 motion for summary judgment, and we want the Court to enforce 
5 the lack of a timely opposition. That's in the pleadings, on 
6 page 2. It is not the Court's motion. 
7 MR. WINEGAR: And I understand that. I guess what I 
8 am saying is that, with the cooperation here, no one has 
9 complained if interrogatories are a few days late, if anything 
10 like this is a few days late. And for my client to be punished 
11 when I think I did everything possible — I responded to a 
12 fairly complex motion in the manner of two or three days. And 
13 I think that's all I could do. Up until that two or three 
14 days, I was under the understanding that the plaintiff would 
15 file a response. Plaintiff got the extension of time. 
16 Plaintiff talked with Counsel, and Counsel can have no 
17 objection up to that time, that there was an extension, and 
18 once Plaintiff's counsel said, No, I am not going to respond, 
19 he told me, and we responded within two or three days. 
20 That's all I can do. I don't think there is more 
21 that I could have done, except for — I am not sure. I guess 
22 when it was filed, to request the Court to rule that we didn't 
23 have to respond to it, and the plaintiff would. Or to ask for 
24 an extension, right up front, not knowing what would happen; 
25 that if the plaintiff didn't respond, we would. The plaintiff 
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1 was going to respond. They told us they were going to respond, 
2 right up until a couple of days before we did it, I just donft 
3 think that justice is served, to decide this matter on a 
4 procedural issue. If, as Mr. Belnap argues, the motion is well 
5 taken, then grant it, based on the merits. But I don't think 
6 it is well taken, and I think Dr. de Nevers points that out in 
7 his testimony, and I think that the Court should hear that and 
8 depend on justice between the parties. 
9 THE COURT: Anything further before the Court rules 
10 on the question of whether or not to consider NSI's opposition 
11 to Norton!s motion, and then decide the case on the merits? 
12 MR. BELNAP: No, I think we have argued it, Judge. 
13 THE COURT: It is clear to the Court that there was 
14 not a timely response by way of opposition to Nortonfs motion 
15 for summary judgment. However, the Court will, in light of the 
16 informal agreement between counsel, consider the pleadings 
17 filed by NSI in opposition to Norton's motion for summary 
18 judgment, and you may argue the merits, or the lack thereof. 
19 MR. KING: Your Honor, may I just say, before we go 
20 on, I think that's an appropriate decision by the Court. I 
21 kind of feel somewhat responsible for Mr. Winegar's dilemma. I 
22 think the Court is recognizing something that is commonly done 
23 among counsel, to try to work together. Normally, we extend 
24 deadlines like this all the time. The Court doesn't get 
25 involved. It furthers the interest of justice. I think the 
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1 Court has resolved this appropriately. I appreciate it. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed. Let the 
3 Court ask two or three pointed questions, and then argue as you 
4 deem appropriate. Do you now have or will you ever have, in 
5 your candid opinion, an expert who will say the container that 
6 was made by Norton, and given to your client, was defective? 
7 MR. WINEGAR: Yes, your Honor. I think that 
8 Dr. de Nevers says that. We would also have Larry Anderson, 
9 out of California, who is our expert, who would do that, too. 
10 THE COURT: What was defective about it? 
11 MR. WINEGAR: I think that there are three points, 
12 three disputed facts regarding its defect. Frankly, some of 
13 this physics is hard to understand. I am going to quote from 
14 Dr. de Nevers1 deposition, and you are going to see I didnft 
15 understand it. It took me several hours with Dr. de Nevers in 
16 the deposition before I understood it. 
17 The first disputed fact, the first item I should 
18 indicate is Dr. de Nevers did not say the can was defective. 
19 That is true. But neither did Dr. de Nevers say that NSI's 
20 product was defective. Dr. de Nevers offered just three 
21 opinions, and then, of course, a bunch of subopinions, factual 
22 information to back those up. 
23 First of all, he said the accident was caused by gas 
24 pressure driving the seal into the eye of the plaintiff. 
25 THE COURT: What did Norton have to do with that? 
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MR. WINEGAR: Well, if I may, there is only one of 
these three opinions that matters, and that's the one that 
shows what Norton has to do. The first one is that it hit the 
seal into his eye. The second opinion was that a similar 
container had approximately five pounds of pressure, and that 
was enough to drive it into the eye. And the third was that 
the cause of the pressure was dissolved air. That's the only 
one we have to talk about. That is the one that shows that 
Norton was responsible for it. 
I think that the big misunderstanding we have had 
here is whether it was the contents of the container that 
created this pressure, or the container itself. And the facts 
that Norton lists as undisputed are No. 3, which says that NSI 
made the determination what finished product would be placed in 
the pail. That is true, too. But it doesn't ask the correct 
question, and that is, was it the container that caused the 
pressure, or the contents? 
Also, fact No. 4, that they claim is undisputed, NSI 
never consulted what type of — with Norton what type of 
product would be put into the container. Again, it is true, 
but it doesn't ask the right question. The question is, was it 
the contents of the container that created the pressure? If it 
was, I have to admit Norton should be out. But it was not the 
contents that created the pressure. It was the container 
itself. 
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1 THE COURT: Would your expert say, if that had been 
2 filled with water, there would have been an explosion? 
3 MR. WINEGAR: Exactly. If it would have been filled 
4 with water, there would have been the same effect, if it would 
5 have been filled with nothing. 
6 THE COURT: Sand? 
7 MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I don't know sand for sure, 
8 because it is designed for liquids, and I have only talked 
9 about liquids. I am guessing sand would. I don't know that. 
10 Norton's testimony was it was designed for things like food 
11 products, vegetable oil, paint, ink, the cleaning solution we 
12 had in it, any of those, the result would have been the same, 
13 including water or empty. 
14 And I think that Dr. de Nevers indicated there are 
15 three possible causes of the can pressure. One is altitude, 
16 two is temperature, and three is a chemical reaction. And 
17 Dr. de Nevers discusses those three possibilities. Those are 
18 the only three possibilities. 
19 THE COURT: But he doesn't point the finger? 
20 MR. WINEGAR: Yes. He eliminates the chemical 
21 reaction. And the chemical reaction is the only one we are 
22 responsible for. He says — I say on page 54 of the 
23 deposition, "Let me make sure I understand the possibilities of 
24 the air coming out of the solution. I want to make sure what 
25 are the possibilities. The first possibility is that a mere 
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rise in altitude brings some air out of the solution." He 
says, "No, that is incorrect." It takes me a page or so to get 
the correct answer, which I will read to you. 
On the next page, he says, "Recognize the distinction 
between pressure inside the container and pressure difference 
from inside the container to outside the container. Change in 
altitude does not change the pressure inside the container but 
it does change the difference in pressure." 
And what that is, your Honor, Dr. de Nevers testified 
this was filled in Santa Clara, California, which is in the Bay 
Area. The sea level pressure there is 14.7 pounds. And so 
when that can is filled up, and sealed, it has 14.7 pounds in 
it. It then comes to Salt Lake City. Dr. de Nevers says that 
here in Salt Lake we have 12 and a half pounds of pressure. 
But this, because it is sealed, still has the 14.7. So there 
is a difference in pressure. There is not really an increase, 
but there is a difference. This now is pressurized to 2.2 
pounds relative here to Salt Lake City. 
It is kind of a potato chip bag effect. We have all 
seen a potato chip bag that's blown up. It gets filled, and it 
is just puffed out. That doesn!t matter with potato chips, 
because the container gives. This container did not give. So 
there is pressure inside. So we have altitude is the first 
possible cause. 
And Dr. de Nevers continues on page 54, "So causing 
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the air to come out of solution may be caused by a temperature 
difference? 
"A. Yes, 
"Q. What other potential causes? 
"A. Chemical reactions. 
"Q. Would other potential causes? 
"A. Those are the only ones I can think of." 
There are only three, temperature, altitude and 
chemical. He eliminates the chemical response. He says — and 
he does a lot of tests. He does a mass spectrometry test, he 
does a gas chromatograph test. He looks for peroxides in it. 
He tries to see if the contents, this cleaning solution, has 
interacted with the steel of the pail, with the sealant that's 
around the lid, with the liner that's in the pail, and he comes 
up with nothing. There was no chemical reaction. He says — 
it is kind of long — this is the question, "You indicate that 
there were efforts to find other causes. What other causes did 
you consider and eliminate? 
"A. Chemical reactions between the ingredients in 
Zep high-foam degreaser, formation of peroxides. I think 
that's all. 
"Q. Your information on the formation of peroxides 
is contained in your notes? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You concluded that peroxides were not formed? 
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1 "A. I could not show that they had been formed, 
2 "Q. In fact, I presume it is your opinion that they 
3 were not formed and were not a cause of this accident? 
4 "A. Yes, that is correct." 
5 And then back on page 55, when he says that a 
6 possibility of creating the pressure was the chemicals, I ask, 
7 "Have you considered any particular chemical reaction that 
8 might plausibly have caused it? 
9 He says, "You will recall that I told you I studied 
10 the question of chemical reaction, and I discussed it with 
11 people more knowledgeable than I, and, based on what they told 
12 me and on the analysis of the gas in the head space, concluded 
13 that it was extremely unlikely. But you asked me what the 
14 other causes were, and what the causes could have been, and I 
15 answered." 
16 So he says that he has eliminated by his analysis the 
17 chemical reaction. So this is caused by altitude and 
18 temperature difference. If I could show to the Court, this is 
19 an exemplar lid of the pail. This spout is questionable. 
20 Evidently, it was not on the one in question. But this is the 
21 pry-out lid that the plaintiff claims hit his eye. This 
22 temperature — this altitude difference is the main component. 
23 Dr. de Nevers isn't sure how much the temperature difference 
24 was. 
25 In fact, the temperature difference was only a few 
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1 degrees. It was somewhere probably in the 60fs when this was 
2 filled on an August morning in Santa Clara, California, and it 
3 was about low to mid 70's in June in a temperature-controlled 
4 warehouse when this was opened. So the main difference we have 
5 here is just the difference between sea level and Salt Lake 
6 City. And that would have happened if it was ink, it would 
7 have happened if it was vegetable oil, it would have happened 
8 if it was water. 
9 In fact, Dr. de Nevers says that if there is more air 
10 in there, there is more force. So it can be argued that we 
11 actually reduced the explosive power by putting the soap in it. 
12 Had there been more air in there, it would have been even more 
13 explosive. We use thcT exactly as they anticipated. They knew 
14 that it was being shipped around. They knew that it was going 
15 to have a liquid in it. And the fact that the degreaser didn't 
16 make any difference and didn't cause this means that it was the 
17 container, and not the contents. 
18 Now, there is one other disputed fact that they claim 
19 that is inaccurate, and that is their disputed fact No. 7. It 
20 says the design on the outside of the BW Norton pail supplied 
21 to NSI is generic, so that paper labels can be applied to the 
22 pail, depending on what material is placed in the pail. 
23 THE COURT: That's true, is it not? 
24 MR. WINEGAR: It is true. Again, it begs the 
25 question. We put a label on there that tells you everything 
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you want to know about the contents of the pail. This lid is 
what caused the injury. The contents of the pail didn!t cause 
an injury. And the instructions, if I may give this to the 
Court, say pry out, with an arrow pointing to a hole. Those 
were instructions that came with the pail, on how to open it. 
This was an accident that occurred while opening it. And if 
those instructions are inaccurate, if there is some sort of 
lack of warning on the opening instructions, those are not our 
instructions. That's exactly how we got it. We didn't emboss 
those instructions on there. We decide how appropriate they 
were. 
It is interesting to note that Norton's opinion on 
how this should be opened, and, obviously, the instructions, it 
points to that little hole. If you puncture that hole, it 
would release any altitude pressure, and this accident wouldn't 
have happened. Certainly, any inadequacy in those instructions 
is Norton's problem. It is not our problem. They were the 
ones who decided what kind of instructions or warnings were 
there. And they are the ones that should be accountable for 
that. We warned on the contents. But the contents didn't 
cause any damage. This small lid with the instructions already 
embossed on it by Norton is, according to the plaintiff's 
theory, the item that caused the injury, and it was caused, 
according to the plaintiff's expert, by this difference in 
altitude, and a slight difference in temperature. And those, 
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1 again, are not contents. It would have happened with water, 
2 ink, paint, or with the soap that we had in there. 
3 In summary, although Dr. de Nevers never says the can 
4 is defective, never says the product is defective, he does a 
5 fairly long list of scientific tests, and eliminates any kind 
6 of chemical reaction in there, and opines that it is altitude 
7 and temperature differences. And that, together with the fact 
8 that the instructions on opening were already embossed when we 
9 got it, shows that it was not the contents of the container 
10 that caused this accident, but it was the container itself. 
11 Therefore, BW Norton is responsible for that. 
12 I should note, as always, that we only have to raise 
13 a factual question. Here I think there is more than that. 
14 Plaintiff's expert has put on a case that it is the container 
15 rather than the contents. 
16 THE COURT: Counsel? 
17 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, I will try to be brief, 
18 because I think your Honor is aware of the issues, but there 
19 are a couple of points I want to discuss. First of all, this 
20 case is ripe for summary judgment. It is a legal question on 
21 the duty issue of BW Norton. 
22 THE COURT: The duty to warn? 
23 MR. BELNAP: The duty to warn. And also with respect 
24 to the cases that have dealt with the component part 
25 manufacturer, which we fall into line with, your Honor. 
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If you look at the undisputed testimony in this case, 
there may be a 2.2 pound pressure differential, but it was 
measured in a container from the same batch at over five pounds 
of pressure differential. But to get to the heart of what I 
want to speak to in calling this a container problem, and not a 
product problem, Mr. Winegar ignores the fact that he packages 
this product. He fills the container. He puts the lid on. He 
chooses how much head space he is going to leave between the 
level of the liquid product and the top of the lid, which is 
significant, according to Dr. de Nevers. They are the people 
in total control of this operation. 
Let's look at the deposition testimony, your Honor, 
that I think locks the door on this motion, Mr. Graham, the 
engineer from Santa Clara or San Jose. "To your knowledge, did 
anyone at Zep ever indicate to anyone from BW Norton that the 
materials that would be placed in any of these steel pails 
would be such that would create any vapor pressure or head 
space pressure? 
"A. Well, of course, we didn't, because it was not a 
problem. To my knowledge, we are getting the same pail now as 
then." 
Let's go to the Ph.D. engineer who is in charge of 
research, development, and this product, out of Atlanta. If I 
could approach and let your Honor follow in his deposition. 
This is Dr. Fineman, your Honor. Please turn, if you would, 
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1 back to page 82, line 23. "We have talked here in this 
2 deposition about the fact that you don't anticipate that the 
3 chemicals that make up this product would result in any 
4 significant head pressure, unless stored in an oven, or these 
5 other examples you used. Do you remember that discussion? 
6 "A. That's correct. 
7 "Q. Given that testimony on your part, do you have 
8 any information which would indicate that at any time Zep ever 
9 advised my client, who manufactured these pails at one time or 
10 another for Zep, that these particular pails needed to be a 
11 pressure vessel? 
12 "A. For this product? 
13 "Q. Yes. 
14 "A. No, not that I am aware of." 
15 Then there was some discussion by Mr* Winegar about 
16 temperature variation can possibly raise vapor pressure. 
17 Going over to page 84, line 4, "And within those 
18 parameters, do you believe these particular pails of the type 
19 that Mr. King has shown you in the photographs are fit for the 
20 purpose of this chemical that you put in them? 
21 "A. Yes, they are." 
22 Now, getting to the labeling issue, which is totally 
23 in the control of Zep, your Honor, I would like to go over to 
24 page — let me just represent, for the sake of time, that 
25 starting on page 85, going through 86 and 87, the label that I 
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showed you previously was talked about. And it was indicated 
and admitted that that was a document they prepared. And what 
is significant, if you turn to page 88, where I have got the 
yellow tab, Mr. King asks the question, on line 16, "But I do 
want to establish one thing. This warning about wearing 
eyeglasses was never intended by Zep to address the possibility 
of the cap being propelled off because of the head space 
pressure, was it? 
"A. No, because we have never had a situation of 
that kind occur." This is significant, your Honor. "But the 
warning applies to the handling of the product, the product 
container, call it what you will, simply is a matter of 
prudence and precaution. In this case it would have protected 
the gentleman." 
So Dr. Fineman there is indicating that the warning 
that they decided to put on, they authored, they wrote it, they 
never consulted with my client about it, they never asked for 
input, they never asked for a pressure vessel, when we carry a 
variety of products, that can release pressure, and they 
specify to us they wanted this cap, with this inner seal. It 
is their product. They are in control of it. As a matter of 
law, the motion is well taken, your Honor. 
MR. WINEGAR: May I respond to this? 
THE COURT: Brief response. 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, this is a matter of forming 
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1 the issues. What he indicates is that our people don't think 
2 there is anything the matter with the pail. And he is 
3 absolutely right. We think he was hit in the eye with a knife. 
4 But that!s not the question. The question is, is there a 
5 factual issue that the jury might not believe our people, and 
6 may believe the plaintiff's story, and may believe the 
7 plaintiff's expert? That's the question on summary judgment. 
8 And I acknowledge it is unusual to read these quotes from our 
9 people that it is not defective. We don't think it is 
10 defective. But the plaintiff's expert does. It does for two 
11 reasons. 
12 The Court was very apropos in its first question it 
13 asked to me, and that was, would this have happened if this was 
14 water? The answer is yes. That has not been disputed. I have 
15 quoted from Dr. de Nevers. I have showed the Court what it 
16 took me a long time to understand it, and that is it is the 
17 altitude increase. It happens if it is vegetable oil, water, 
18 paint, even if it is empty. It is not the contents of the 
19 container. And if Plaintiff's story is believed, then Norton 
20 is responsible. 
21 This is happening — this could happen with 
22 degreaser, it could happen when they ship paint to Denver, it 
23 could happen when they ship vegetable oil up to Snowbird. If 
24 that is the true facts of the case, Norton needs to do 
25 something about their product. 
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The second thing is the duty to warn. I have showed 
the Court that inner seal. That is what caused the damage. It 
wasn't the degreaser. He wasn't hurt by the degreaser. It was 
that seal. And the instructions on that seal were made by 
Norton. If those instructions are inadequate, if they are 
incomplete, it is Norton!s responsibility to instruct as to the 
container. Our responsibility is to instruct as to the 
contents. But the contents did no injury. Because of the fact 
that the plaintiff's story is believed, Norton is responsible, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
THE COURT: All sides submit? 
MR. WINEGAR: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. BELNAP: Yes. 
THE COURT: The Court has permitted the opposition 
filed by NSI to be considered in Norton's motion for summary 
judgment. The Court has read the pleadings. The Court has 
heard the argument. And the Court finds and rules as follows. 
The record is deficient in establishing, by expert 
opinion or otherwise, any evidence that would suggest the 
container, in and of itself, was defective in any way. The 
record is further defective — or lacking, rather, in 
suggesting that the manufacturer of the container either had 
the responsibility or the option of placing any label upon the 
container that would suggest to an ultimate consumer how they 
should deal with the container and/or its contents. 
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1 The Court finds that there has been no evidence 
2 advanced by the co-defendant NSI that would suggest that the 
3 Norton company made a defective product, that they were remiss 
4 in failing to correctly warn by appropriate labeling, or that 
5 they owed a duty, either to NSI or any other ultimate user or 
6 consumer of this container and its contents, to do anything 
7 other than what they in fact did. 
8 The Court further finds that the duty to warn did not 
9 exist with Norton. The lid was a component part, and there is 
10 no expert testimony that anything was defective, either in the 
11 lid or in the instruction on removing the lid from the 
12 container. 
13 The Court finds that the defendant's motion is well 
14 taken, because there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
15 regarding their liability to the plaintiff, or to any other 
16 person, other than what they did in the construction of the 
17 container. 
18 The Court is mindful there may be some speculation by 
19 the expert on what could have happened, but there is nothing in 
20 the record that is remotely close to an opinion by the expert 
21 that Norton did anything that was inappropriate in the 
22 assembling or the distribution of their containers. 
23 Based on those findings, the Court concludes, as a 
24 matter of law, Norton is entitled to summary judgment, and so 
25 rules. 
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The Court orders that Norton prepare exhaustive, 
detailed, thorough, itemized, specific findings of fact, 
including, but not necessarily limited to, those made by the 
Court from the bench. If they are appropriate, the Court will 
adopt them in its opinion. The Court orders that the findings 
of fact and the conclusions of law and the order be submitted 
to the Court for signature on or before May 30, 1994. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could we have just a few 
days beyond that? 
THE COURT: June 6. 
MR. BELNAP: That would be great. 
THE COURT: Is that agreeable? 
MR. WINEGAR: Yes. May I ask one thing? Could we 
publish the depositions that I referred to today? 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BELNAP: No. 
THE COURT: Motion is granted. They have been quoted 
from extensively. And the motion to publish is granted. 
(This proceeding was concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN D. PACKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a California 
corporation; and INTERNA-
TIONAL MACHINE & TOOL 
WORKS, an Illinois limited 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920902466CV 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 16th day of May, 1994, at the hour of 9:00 A.M., before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, on defendant 
B. W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Counsel of record appeared on behalf of the plaintiff 
and defendants, National Service Industries (hereinafter "NSI") 
and B. W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Norton"). 
The court received and reviewed the memoranda filed in 
support of and in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and considered the merits of the matter including the memoranda 
filed by NSI and the argument of counsel for NSI overruling the 
objection of defendant Norton as to the failure of NSI to comply 
with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
After having reviewed the aforementioned memoranda and 
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the Court 
determined that the motion for summary judgment filed by Norton 
should be granted for the following reasons: 
The court concluded that there were no material disputed 
issues of fact and that the facts established that Norton 
manufactured the steel pail in question with a steel cover/lid 
that incorporated a pour spout. The pour spout, cap and seal 
were manufactured by International Machine & Tool and were 
installed into the cover for the steel pail by Norton. 
The steel pail was manufactured pursuant to the 
specifications of NSI and Norton shipped to NSI the component 
parts consisting of the cover and steel pail. 
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NSI did not consult with Norton concerning what product 
they would place in the pail and as a matter of practice, NSI 
would package their own product in the pail, close the container, 
apply a warning label authored by NSI to the container and would 
ship the product to an NSI customer without consulting with 
Norton at any step in that process. 
The steel pail in question was received by NSI in its 
component parts in a generic painted condition. NSI packaged the 
Hi-Foam Degreaser product in the pail, closed the container and 
then applied its own warning and instruction label to the pail 
without consulting Norton in the process. 
The warning/instruction label applied to the pail was 
authored by NSI and NSI did not consult with Norton concerning 
the content of the same. 
Norton was never advised by NSI that the steel pail and 
components shipped to NSI would contain products creating vapor 
pressure in the head space and NSI never consulted Norton or 
asked for a steel pail that would be a pressure vessel. 
Engineers from NSI had no opinion that the steel pail 
components were defective. No expert in the case rendered such 
opinion. 
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As a component part manufacturer supplying the steel pail 
and cover under the circumstances and conditions involved, Norton 
did not have a duty to warn. 
At the time the pail left Norton, it was not in a 
defective condition. 
For the reasons stated above and as indicated by the 
court in its ruling on the motion, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of defendant Norton is granted and the claims of 
the plaintiff against defendant Norton are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
The depositions referenced in the parties' memoranda and 
in the argument of counsel of Spencer Graham, Manuel Fineman, 
Noel de Nevers, Gerald Bettridge, and Howard Norton are 
published. 
With the dismissal of defendant Norton, and based upon 
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain, et al., the trier of fact will not be asked to determine 
an issue of fault or causation of the accident relative to 
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defendant Norton, 
DATED t h i s /^L day of > v V ^ J^2tfJ*Jr. . 1994, 
BY THE XOURT 
JJL   Q&&0 SSM^M. 
G~Ja 
Pat B. Brian 
Di s t r i c t Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this fo<^ day of June, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Colin P. King 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Todd S. Winegar 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant National Service Industries 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
f
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CHARLES COTESWORTA 
PlNCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER 
Georgia WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN 
In Convention Monday September 17th 178? 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Absent 
and Ratification, and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceeding^ un-
der this Constitution That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned, 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President, and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention 
Go WASHINGTON, Presidt W JACKSON, Secretary 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered m 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
DT Ynfotfanem. t£ a CVronu 5\xry, except m rases ansmg 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger, nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation, to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1 [Inherent and inalienable r ights ] 
2 [All political power inherent in the people ] 
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ] 
4 [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office ] 
5 [Habeas corpus ] 
6 [Right to bear a rms ] 
7 [Due process of law ] 
8 [Offenses bailable ] 
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments ] 
10 [Trial by jury ] 
11 [Courts open — Redress of injur ies] 
12 [Rights of accused persons ] 
[Rights of accused persons ] [Proposed ] 
13 [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury ] 
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant ] 
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ] 
16 [No imprisonment for debt — Exception ] 
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ] 
18 [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impair ing 
contracts ] 
19 [Treason defined — Proof] 
20 [Military subordinate to the civil power] 
21 [Slavery forbidden ] 
22 [Private property for public use ] 
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden ] 
24 [Uniform operation of laws ] 
25 [Rights retained by people ] 
26 [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory ] 
27 [Fundamental rights] 
28 [Declaration of the r ights of crime victims ] [Pro-
posed ] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire, 
possess and protect property, to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences, to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances, to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people, and all 
free governments are founded on their authori ty for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
r ight to al ter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
J
' The r ights of conscience shall never be infringed 
 The State shall make no law respecting an estabhsh-
J
" ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rus t or for any vote a t 
any election, nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof There shall be no union of Church 
arid State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establ ishment No property 
,0 qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
• ] be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it 1896 
Sec . 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear 
— arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
f poses shall not be infringed, but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
Of arms 1984 (2nd S S ) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
lg No person shall be deprived of life, l iberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except 
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, des-
ignated by statute as one for which bail may be 
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support 
the charge and the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person would consti-
tute a substantial danger to any other person or 
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion of the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
[Rights of accused persons.] [Pro-
posed.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a pre-
liminary examination, the function of that examina-
tion is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing 
in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable 
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceed-
ing with respect to release of the defendant if appro-
priate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or 
rule. 11994] 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the t ruth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury tha t the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium 
in which the injured person is confined as a result of 
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable 
by the injured person, as provided in this act. 
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settle-
ment agreement, together with any payment or other 
consideration received in connection with this release 
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party 
to whom the release or settlement agreement was 
given, by the later of the following dates: 
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the oc-
currence causing the injuries which are subject of 
the settlement agreement or liability release; or 
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the in-
jured person's discharge from the hospital or san-
itarium in which this person has been confined 
continuously since the date of the occurrence 
causing the injury. 1973 
78-27-33. Statement of injured person — When 
inadmissible as evidence. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any state-
ment, either written or oral, obtained from an injured 
person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this 
person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a 
result of injuries sustained in the occurrence, and 
which statement is obtained by a person whose inter-
est is adverse or may become adverse to the injured 
person, except a law enforcement officer, shall not be 
admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding 
brought by or against the injured person for damages 
sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless: 
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement 
has been left with the injured party at the time 
the statement was taken; and 
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in 
writing within fifteen days of the date of the 
statement or within fifteen days after the date of 
the injured person's initial discharge from the 
hospital or sanitarium in which the person has 
been confined, whichever date is later. 1992 
78-27-34. Release, settlement or statement by in-
jured person — When rescission or dis-
avowal provisions inapplicable. 
This act shall not apply in the following circum-
stances: 
If at least five days prior to signing the settle-
ment agreement, liability release, or statement, 
the injured person has signed a statement in 
writing indicating his willingness that the settle-
ment agreement, liability release, or statement 
be given or signed. 1992 
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by 
injured person — Notice of rescission 
or disavowal. 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a state-
ment, if given by mail, is given when it is deposited in 
a mailbox, properly addressed with postage prepaid. 
Notice of cancellation given by the injured person 
need not take a particular form and is sufficient if it 
indicates by any form of written expression the inten-
tion of the injured person not to be bound by the set-
tlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed 
statement. 1973 
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of re-
lease, settlement, or statement by in-
jured person in addition to other pro-
visions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights of rescis-
sion, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise exist-
ing in the law. 1973 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a 
person immune from suit as defined in Subsec-
tion (3), who is claimed to be liable because of 
fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of le-
gal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including negligence in 
all its degrees, contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability, 
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under 
Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmen-
tal employee immune from suit pursuant to 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immu-
nity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery"-means any per-
son seeking damages or reimbursement on its 
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 1994 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from 
any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, 
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, 
exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior 
to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 
78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 
78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault at-
tributable to each defendant, the fact finder may, 
and when requested by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the 
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is 
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the 
alleged injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune 
from suit is considered only to accurately deter-
mine the fault of the person seeking recovery and 
a defendant and may not subject the person im-
mune from suit to any liability, based on the allo-
cation of fault, in this or any other action. 1994 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total 
damages and proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find sepa-
rate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, 
to each defendant, and to any person immune from 
suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit 
is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that 
percentage or proportion of fault to zero and real-
locate that percentage or proportion of fault to 
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the other parties in proportion to the percentage 
or proportion of fault initially attributed to each 
party by the fact finder After this reallocation, 
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the per-
sons immune from suit being allocated no fault 
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit ' 
is 40% or more, that percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to persons immune from suit 
may not be reduced under Subsection (2)(a) 
(c) d) The jury may not be advised of the effect 
of any reallocation under Subsection (2) 
(n) The jury may be advised that fault at-
tributed to persons immune from suit may 
reduce the award of the person seeking re-
covery 
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held 
liable, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any 
jther action 1994 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to propor-
tion of fault — No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to any 
person seeking recovery is that percentage or propor-
tion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from 
any other person 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may 
not bring a civil action against any person immune 
from suit to recover damages resulting from the allo-
cation of fault under Section 78-27-38 1994 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant 
who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defen-
dant, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, any person other than a person immune from 
suit who may have caused or contributed to the injury 
or damage for which recovery is sought, for the pur-
pose of having determined their respective propor-
tions of fault 
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named 
as a defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person 
immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately 
determining the fault of the person seeking recovery 
and a defendant A person immune from suit is not 
subject to any liability, based on the allocation of 
fault, in this or any other action 
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene 
as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money 
damages are sought 
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes 
in an action may not be held liable for any fault 
allocated to that person under Section 78-27-38 
1994 
78-27-42. Re lease to one defendant does not dis-
charge other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one 
or more defendants does not discharge any other de-
fendant unless the release so provides 1986 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, 
indemnity, contribution. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 af-
fects or impairs any common law or statutory immu-
nity from liability, including, but not limited to, gov-
ernmental immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter 
30, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 35, 
Chapter 1 Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or 
contribution arising from statute, contract, or agree-
ment 1986 
78-27-44. Personal injury judgments — Interest 
authorized. 
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for 
personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting 
from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, 
corporation, association, or partnership, whether by 
negligence or willful intent of that other person, cor-
poration, association, or partnership, and whether 
that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, 
the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on 
the special damages actually incurred from the date 
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of 
action 
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment 
for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of 
special damages actually incurred that are assessed 
by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, inter-
est on that amount calculated at the legal rate, as 
defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date of the occur-
rence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to 
the date of entering the judgment, and to include it in 
that judgment 
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actu-
ally incurred" does not include damages for future 
medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss of fu-
ture earning capacity 1991 
78-27-45. Financial information privacy — Writ-
ten consent or court order for disclo-
sure by financial institution — Excep-
tion — "Person" defined. 
(1) A person acting in behalf of the state, or any 
agency, office, department, bureau, or political subdi-
vision of the state may not request or obtain by sub-
poena or otherwise information from a state or feder-
ally chartered financial institution regarding the fi-
nancial transactions or other records reflecting the 
financial condition of any person without first obtain-
ing written permission from the person whose finan-
cial transactions or other records of financial condi-
tion are to be examined, or obtaining an order from a 
court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to 
the information 
(2) This section does not apply to 
(a) reviews made by the commissioner of fi-
nancial institutions to determine whether a fi-
nancial institution is operating in accordance 
with law, or 
(b) reports filed as required by Section 76-
10-1906 
(3) As used in this section, "person" includes an 
individual, corporation, partnership, or association 
1989 
78-27-46. Financial information privacy — No-
tice to person about whom information 
sought. 
(1) In the event a court order is obtained pursuant 
to Section 78-27-45, notice thereof shall be given to 
the person about whom information is sought within 
three days of the day on which service of the order is 
made upon the financial institution, but no later than 
seven days before the day fixed in the order as the 
day upon which the records are to be produced or 
examined The notice shall be accompanied by a copy 
of the order which has been served upon the financial 
institution and the motion or application upon which 
it is based and shall be accompanied by a statement 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and 
does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a mo-
tion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses . A party waives all de-
fenses and objections which he does not present either 
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the 
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indis-
pensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, 
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by sugges-
tion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dis-
miss the action. The objection or defense, if made at 
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing 
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any mo-
tion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Secur i ty for cos ts of a nonresident plaintiff. 
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish secu-
rity for costs and charges which may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, 
the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded 
against such plaintiff No security shall be required 
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the 
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order 
dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compu l so ry counterclaims. A pleading shall 
state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time 
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication 
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state 
the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced 
the claim was the subject of another pending action, 
or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim 
by attachment or other process by which the court did 
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judg-
ment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any 
counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
(b) Pe rmiss ive coun te rc l a im. A pleading may 
state as a counterclaim any claim against an oppos-
ing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party's claim. 
(c) Coun te rc l a im exceed ing opposing claim. A 
counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the 
recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim 
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from 
that sought in the pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after 
pleading. A claim which either matured or was ac-
quired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a 
counterclaim by supplemental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails 
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadver-
tence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, 
he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by 
amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading 
may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party 
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the 
original action or of a counterclaim therein or relat-
ing to any property that is the subject-matter of the 
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim 
that the party against whom it is asserted is or may 
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a 
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claim-
ant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When 
the presence of parties other than those to the origi-
nal action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as 
defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction 
of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counter-
claim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the 
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise dis-
posed *bf. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment 
or death. When cross demands have existed between 
persons under such circumstances that, if one had 
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim 
could have been set up, the two demands shall be 
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, 
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by 
the assignment or death of the other, except as pro-
vided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise 
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and as-
signments of accounts receivable, any claim, counter-
claim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted 
against an assignor at the time of or before notice ol 
such assignment, may be asserted against his as-
signee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, oi 
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim 
of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction, 
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-partj 
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice'* 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such couii 
does not have the power to grant the relief sough! 
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
action and certify the same and transmit all papen 
therein to the district court of the county in wnicr 
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment 
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim oi 
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying 
the record on appeal from such court and for docket 
ing the same in the district court. The fees hereir 
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the cleri 
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counter 
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure sc 
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse 
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, cross 
claim, or third-party claim. 
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i any action so certified to the district court, when 
responsive pleading is required or permitted or a 
ion is allowed under these rules, the time in 
ch such responsive pleading or motion shall be 
le shall commence to run from the time notice of 
filing of the cause in the district court shall be 
ed on the party making such responsive pleading 
notion. 
e 14. Third-party practice. 
) When defendant may bring in third party. 
my time after commencement of the action a de-
lant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sum-
is and complaint to be served upon a person not a 
y to the action who is or may be liable to him for 
)r part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The 
d-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
service if he files the third-party complaint not 
r than ten days after he serveB his original an-
r. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon 
ce to all parties to the action. The person served 
1 the summons and third-party complaint, herein-
r called the third-party defendant, shall make his 
nses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as pro-
d in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the 
d-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other 
d-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The 
d-party defendant may assert against the plain-
my defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to 
plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may 
assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out 
he transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
ter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party 
ntiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against 
third-party defendant arising out of the transac-
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
ntiff s claim against the third-party plaintiff, and 
third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his 
nses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-
ly defendant may proceed under this rule against 
person not a party to the action who is or may be 
le to him for all or part of the claim made in the 
on against the third-party defendant. 
) When plaintiff may bring in third party. 
*n a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, 
nay cause a third party to be brought in under 
umstances which under this rule would entitle a 
ndant to do so. 
e 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
i) Amendments. A party may amend his plead-
once as a matter of course at any time before a 
>onsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
rhich no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
on has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he 
j so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
red. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
i by leave of court or by written consent of the 
erse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
ice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
amended pleading within the time remaining for 
>onse to the original pleading or within 10 days 
r service of the amended pleading, whichever pe-
I may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
*rs. 
)) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
en issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
ress or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
reated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
y be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supple-
mental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permis-
sion may be granted even though the original plead-
ing is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the ad-
verse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and 
management conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court 
in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct 
the attorneys for tjie parties and any unrepresented 
parties to appear before it for a conference or confer-
ences before trial for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control 
so that the case will not be protracted for lack of 
management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through 
more thorough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the 
orderly disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. 
In any action, in addition to any pretrial conferences 
that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion may 
direct that a scheduling or management conference 
be held. The court may direct the attorneys or unrep-
resented parties to appear before the court. Schedul-
ing or management conferences may also be held by 
way of telephone conferencing between the court and 
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions 
and agreements reached at scheduling and manage-
ment conferences may be formally made an order of 
the court. At the conference, the court may consider 
the following matters: 
(1) the formation and simplification of the is-
sues, including the elimination of frivolous 
claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining ad-
ditional parties or amendment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of 
fact and of documents which will avoid unneces-
sary proof, stipulations regarding the authentic-
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, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand 
lry in an action in which such a demand might 
'e been made of right, the court in its discretion 
»n motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all 
les. 
:) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all 
ions not triable of right by a jury the court upon 
tion or of its own initiative may try any issue with 
advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, 
y order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the 
ne effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of 
ht. 
lie 40. Assignment of cases for trial; contin-
uance. 
a) Order and precedence. The district courts 
ill provide by rule for the placing of actions upon 
* trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or 
upon request of a party and notice to the other 
rties or (3) in such other manner as the courts may 
em expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions 
titled thereto by statute. 
[b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a 
rty, the court may in its discretion, and upon such 
*ms as may be just, including the payment of costs 
:asioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or 
aceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is 
ide upon the ground of the absence of evidence, 
ch motion shall also set forth the materiality of the 
idence expected to be obtained and shall show that 
e diligence has been used to procure it. The court 
ay also require the party seeking the continuance 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
pects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon 
mits that such evidence would be given, and that it 
ay be considered as actually given on the trial, or 
fered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not 
postponed upon that ground, 
(c) Taking testimony of w i tnesses present. If re-
ared by the adverse party, the court shall, as a con-
tion to such postponement, proceed to have the tes-
mony of any witness present taken, in the same 
anner as if at the trial; and the testimony so taken 
ay be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
ibject to the same objections that may be made with 
aspect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 
2(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)]. 
ule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) 
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a 
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not 
be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal un-
der this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivi-
sion and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply 
to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the 
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivi-
sion (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the in-
troduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court 
may make such order for the payment of costs of the 
action previously dismissed as it may deem proper 
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the 
plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to ad-
verse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pur-
suant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provi-
sional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond 
or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to 
the adverse party against whom such provisional 
remedy was obtained. 
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a com-
mon question of law or fact are pending before the 
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or 
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all 
the actions consolidated; and it may make such or-
ders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a sepa-
rate trial of any claim* cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or issues. 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the c lerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose ol 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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iem to pay to the other party the amount of 
tiable expenses which the filing of the affida-
»d him to incur, including reasonable attor-
s, and any offending party or attorney may 
Ejed guilty of contempt. 
Declaratory judgments. 
•ocedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
suant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
n accordance with these rules, and the right 
y jury may be demanded under the circum-
md in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
existence of another adequate remedy does 
ude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
ance it on the calendar. 
A. Entry. 
dgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
t otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
11 be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed, 
is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
ed by answers to interrogatories returned by 
irsuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
ate judgment which shall be forthwith 
•y the clerk and filed. 
dgment in other cases . Except as provided 
ivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
i with the clerk. 
ten judgment en te red ; no ta t ion in regis-
;tions and judgment docke t . A judgment is 
i and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
ccept the creation of a lien on real property, 
e same is signed and filed as herein above 
1. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
le judgment in the register of actions and the 
it docket. 
otice of s igning o r en t ry of j u d g m e n t . The 
rig party shall promptly give notice of the 
or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
g proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
ourt. However, the time for filing a notice of 
Is not affected by the notice requirement of 
ivision. 
ldgment after death of a party. If a party 
*r a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
ore judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
d thereon. 
ldgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
' confession is authorized by statute, the party 
the same must file with the clerk of the court 
h the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
by the defendant, to the following effect: 
L) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
5 or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
im and that the sum confessed therefor is 
tly due or to become due; 
2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
•pose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
it liability, it must state concisely the claim 
1 that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
d the same; 
3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
jpecified sum. 
:lerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ind enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
if any. 
led effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner o r attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Sat isfact ion by o r d e r of cour t . When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
count ies . When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed. There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall 
have the same effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New tr ia ls ; a m e n d m e n t s of j u d g m e n t . 
(a) G r o u n d s . Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
